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This Article critiques the constitutionalunderpinningsof the "ministerial
exemption," which grants religious organizations immunity from
discriminationsuits brought by "ministerial"employees. These employees,
who rangefrom parochialschoolteachers to church music directors, cannot
assert Title VII race or sex discrimination claims against their religious
employers-regardless of whether or not religious belief motivated the
discrimination. Lower courts and commentators assert that the right of
church autonomy created by the religion clauses requires this result, but
the Supreme Court has never blessed (nor rejected) it. This Article argues
there is no place for the ministerial exemption under the Supreme Court's
current religion clause jurisprudence. The free exercise clause neither
guarantees religious organizations autonomy in their internal affairs nor
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shields them from neutral laws of general applicability like Title VII. And
while the establishment clauseforbids courts from resolving theological or
spiritual disputes, this Article rejects the unexplored assumption that
adjudicating a Title VII suit requires courts to evaluate a plaintiffs
spiritual qualifications. The Article also briefly explores freedom of
expressive association as an alternative justification for the ministerial
exemption and concludes that, to the extent it applies at all, it only protects
those employers whose religious doctrine requires discrimination.
INTRODUCTION

Consider two sisters. Both want to pursue professional careers where
they can do good. One decides to become a public interest attorney, while
the other feels called to serve as a minister. Each is an academic superstar
and graduates at the top of her respective class.
The attorney is rejected from her town's most prestigious public interest
law firm because the senior partner does not believe that advocacy is an
appropriate field for women. She settles for a job at a public interest firm
that purports to be an equal opportunity employer. To her dismay, she soon
hits a glass ceiling.' Despite her impressive evaluations, all the best cases
and mentoring seem to go to her male colleagues. 2 After she complains to
her superiors about the discriminatory treatment, she is fired.
Her devout sister encounters similar obstacles. After graduation, her
church clarifies its doctrine and declares that ordination is reserved for men
only. 3 In order to fulfill her dream of becoming a minister, she reluctantly
switches to a church that believes men and women may equally serve God
as leaders. Much to her dismay, she encounters a stained glass ceiling. 4
While men who went to school with her win positions at large churches, she
1. Women comprise 17.3% of partners at major law firms and 25% of full professors at
ABA-approved law schools. Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n for Legal Career Prof Is, Women
and Attorneys of Color Continue to Make Small Gains at Large Law Firms (Nov. 17, 2005),
availableat http://www.nalp.org/press/details.php?id=57; Ass'n of Am. Law Sch., Statistical
Report of Law School Faculty #6 (2004-05).
2. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and the Profession: The No-Problem
Problem, 30 Hofstra L. Rev. 1001 (2002) (detailing obstacles for women in the law).
3. Religions that do not permit women to serve as clergy include Roman Catholicism,
Eastern Orthodoxy, Southern Baptist Convention, Church of the Latter Day Saints, and
Orthodox Judaism. See, e.g., Alan Cooperman, Conservative Rabbis Allow Ordained Gays,
Same-Sex Unions, Wash. Post, Dec. 7, 2006, at A17 (reporting that Orthodox Jews do not
ordain women); Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, Women as Clergy: When
Some Faith Groups Started to Ordain Women, and When Two Denominations Stopped,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/femclrgl3.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) (listing Roman

Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and the Church of the Latter Day Saints as being among
those denominations that do not ordain women, and Southern Baptist as having stopped
ordaining women).
4. See Neela Banerjee, Clergywomen Find Hard Path to Bigger Pulpit, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 26, 2006, at Al. See generally Elisabeth S. Wendorff, Employment Discriminationand
Clergywomen: Where the Law Has Fearedto Tread, 3 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud.
135,

141

(1993)

(describing

how

"[c]lergywomen's

experience

of

discrimination parallels that of women who enter any traditionally male field").

employment
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is repeatedly passed over-even though she earned better evaluations.
After she complains to her superiors about the discrepancy, she is fired.
What legal recourse do the sisters have? The sister who chose a secular
path can sue under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 which
prohibits employment discrimination based on an employee's race 6 or sex.
Not so for the sister who followed her religious calling. What is illegal and
unthinkable for secular employers is entirely permissible for religious ones.
Under a judicially created doctrine called the "ministerial exemption,"
religious organizations are immune from race or sex discrimination suits
brought by "ministerial" employees. 7 Thus, religious organizations can,
and regularly do, deny women the influential position of minister, priest,
rabbi, and imam on the grounds that religious doctrine requires such
discrimination. Religious organizations whose beliefs do not require
discrimination or even forbid it can also assert the ministerial exemption. 8
In sum, when it comes to the church-minister relationship, religious
organizations are effectively above the law.
The ministerial exemption is a creation of the lower courts and has never
been blessed (or rejected) by the Supreme Court. 9 Nevertheless, it has
endured for over three decades and continues to serve as the basis for
rejecting a host of discrimination-related claims brought by ministerial
employees.' 0 The exemption raises a number of important constitutional
questions. 1 How do lower courts and commentators justify this judicially
created exemption from antidiscrimination law? Does the Constitution
really require abandonment of Title VII's equal opportunity goals when the
employer is a religious organization? And why are religious organizations
whose beliefs do not require discrimination allowed to benefit from the
protection of the ministerial exemption?
The need to challenge the constitutional underpinnings of the ministerial
exemption is more important than ever due to the increasing role of
religious entities in distributing social services. To a degree unheard of
thirty years ago, religious organizations today provide services to the public
including education, health care, job training, and prison and drug

5. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.

6. Title VII actually forbids discrimination based on race, color, or national origin, but I
will use race as shorthand. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).

7. The ministerial exemption does not cover religious discrimination because § 702 of
Title VII itself permits religious organizations to discriminate against employees on the basis
of religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a). The ministerial exemption is also sometimes
referred to as the ministerial exception.
8. See generally infra Part I.A.
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. See infra Part I.A.

11. Courts obviously cannot legislate; they can, however, create exceptions to legislation
if the Constitution so requires. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 540 (2001)

(finding that an exception to state and federal wiretapping laws was necessary to protect First
Amendment rights under the facts alleged).
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rehabilitation. 12
This expanded role, spurred by the current
Administration's Faith-Based Initiatives 13 and changes in religion clause
jurisprudence, 14 multiplies the number of positions that are potentially
subject to the ministerial exemption.
Much of the scholarly and political debate arising from these
developments has focused on the right of religious organizations to
discriminate based on religion. Less attention has been directed toward the
right of religious entities to discriminate based on race and sex-the focus
of this Article. 15
Most lower courts and commentators assume that the First Amendment's
free exercise clause, the First Amendment's establishment clause, or a
combination of the two, justifies the ministerial exemption. 16 Arguably, the
religion clauses might have justified the ministerial exemption when it was
first enshrined. This Article examines whether its endurance can be
justified in light of the Supreme Court's current First Amendment
jurisprudence, which now emphasizes
more equal treatment between
7
religious and secular entities.'
Before the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v.
Smith, 18 for example, the free exercise clause required strict scrutiny of
laws that substantially burdened religious practices1 9-and exemptions
12. By "religious organization," I mean a church or faith-based organization that has
kept its religious character, as opposed to organizations such as Catholic Charities, Lutheran
Social Services, and Jewish Family Services, which have roots in organized religion but are
essentially secular in nature.
13. Within days of taking office, President George W. Bush issued an executive order
creating the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives to increase
participation of faith-based organizations in all federal social services programs. See, e.g.,
Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 29, 2001). Under this Initiative, faithbased organizations may receive federal money without having to sacrifice their religious
character. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77141 (Dec. 12, 2002).
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. While the arguments in this Article apply to both race and sex discrimination, I will
focus principally on sex discrimination because it is both the harder and more common case.
16. See infra Part I.B.1-2.
17. See infra Part II.C. In other words, my goal is not to critique Supreme Court
decisions, despite my disagreement with many of them, but to ascertain the legitimacy of the
ministerial exemption within the Court's existing jurisprudence.
18. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
19. Specifically, such a law violated the free exercise clause unless it was narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See infra note 70. Therefore, if Title VII
imposed a substantial burden on the religious practice of selecting ministers, Title VII would
violate the free exercise clause unless ending discrimination was a compelling state interest.
Cf infra note 70. Before Smith, commentators suggested that antidiscrimination might not
be a sufficiently compelling interest to justify intrusion into church affairs. See, e.g., Bruce
N. Bagni, Discriminationin the Name of the Lord: A CriticalEvaluation of Discrimination
By Religious Organizations,79 Colum. L. Rev. 1514, 1539 (1979) (arguing that "[o]nly the
most compelling government interest [like] the need to assure the physical well-being of
church members or... security of the community, might justify" interference with the
church-clergy relationship); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81
Colum. L. Rev. 1373, 1403 (1981) [hereinafter Laycock, Church Autonomy] ("The state has
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from laws that failed strict scrutiny. In Smith, however, the Court declared
that neutral laws of general applicability may substantially burden religious
practices. 20 In other words, exemptions from laws like Title VII are no
longer constitutionally mandated. Yet, commentators and lower courts
alike insist2 that
Smith did not eliminate or even diminish the ministerial
1
exemption.
This Article rebuts claims that the free exercise clause justification
survives Smith. In addition, for the first time in the literature, it
systematically analyzes and refutes the faulty assumptions underlying the
establishment clause justification. Finally, the Article casts a skeptical eye
on an alternate basis for the exemption-the First Amendment freedom of
expressive association. Disagreeing with the lower courts and most
commentators, the Article concludes that the Supreme Court's current view
of the religion clauses does not mandate the ministerial exemption and that
the right of expressive association offers only limited, if any, support.
Part I of this Article first examines the genesis, scope, and continuing
vitality of the ministerial exemption. It then presents the standard
justifications for the exemption. The ministerial exemption survives Smith
primarily because lower courts claim there is a distinct constitutional right
of church autonomy in internal ecclesiastical affairs. 22 Often citing preSmith commentary by Douglas Laycock and Bruce Bagni, 23 these courts
ground church autonomy in the free exercise clause either alone or in
combination with the establishment clause. 24 For doctrinal support, they
cite a line of cases resolving church property disputes where the Supreme
Court deferred to church hierarchy. Indeed, some commentators argue that
Smith reaffirmed the church autonomy principle established by the church
property cases. 25 Other commentators recast church autonomy, and the
ministerial exemption that flows from it, as grounded in the establishment
clause. 26 A few turn to the freedom of association 2 7 or some combination
no legitimate interest sufficient to warrant protection of church members from their church
with respect to discrimination, economic exploitation, or a wide range of other evils that the
state tries to prevent in the secular economy.").
20. See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.

22. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
23. See Bagni, supra note 19; Laycock, ChurchAutonomy, supra note 19.
24. See infra Part I.B.
25. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The
Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 1633, 1636, 1672 [hereinafter Brady,
SurprisingLessons] (asserting that Smith supports a broad right of autonomy that extends to
all aspects of church affairs); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion,
50 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 4, 19-20 (2000) (stating that Smith reaffirmed a church's autonomy

regarding its internal governance).
26. See Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional
Questions, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 151, 210-11, 218-19 (2003); Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and
Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the EarlyAmerican Republic, 2004 BYU
L. Rev. 1385 [hereinafter Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment] (arguing that the

ministerial exemption springs more from government's lack of power to regulate religious
entities in areas within their exclusive province than from the need to protect free exercise
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2 8 Almost
of the above.
all support the ministerial exemption to some
29
degree
This Article rejects the notion that church autonomy is a distinct
constitutional right. To the extent any right to church autonomy exists, it
does not exceed the rights that flow directly from various First Amendment
clauses including (1) the free exercise clause, (2) the establishment clause,
and (3) freedom of expressive association guaranteed by the free speech
clause.
Part II explains why the free exercise clause cannot ground the
ministerial exemption. Smith eviscerated the notion that the free exercise
clause mandates exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability. 30
Proponents of the ministerial exemption have nonetheless distinguished
Smith on the ground that it concerned only religious individuals' free
exercise rights and left unchanged the free exercise autonomy right of
religious organizations. I offer three responses to this claim. First, the preSmith Supreme Court cases that are often cited as supporting a right of
church autonomy actually support a more limited right derived from the
establishment clause. Second, the claim that Smith altered religious
individuals' free exercise rights, but left intact religious institutions' free
rights); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on
Governmental Power, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Esbeck, Structural Restraint]
(stating that the establishment clause offers considerable autonomy to religion and religious
organizations); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical
Immunity, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 1789, 1815 [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct]
(asserting that the ministerial exemption is not about fights but about jurisdictional limits on
a state's role imposed by the establishment clause).
27. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of
Conscience: The ConstitutionalBasisfor ProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1245, 1275-77, 1311-14 (1994) (arguing that the ministerial exemption is protected as a right
of intimate association); Laura B. Mutterperl, Employment at (God's) Will:
The
Constitutionality of Anti-discrimination Exemptions in Charitable Choice Legislation, 37
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 389, 391-92 (2002) (claiming that the freedom of association
protects religious organizations who must discriminate to define their identity); Mark
Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 71, 72 (2001) (stating
that the right of expressive association provides a constitutional basis for exempting religious
organizations from antidiscrimination law).
28. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the
Freedom of Religion or Belief in the United States, 19 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 1187, 1273-74
(2005) (arguing that church autonomy is limited to associational rights and lack of
jurisdiction over theological questions).
29. Exceptions include Joanne C. Brant, "Our Shield Belongs to the Lord": Religious
Employers and a ConstitutionalRight to Discriminate,21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 275, 311-13
(1994) (arguing that there is no free exercise right to the ministerial exemption); Jane
Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value:
The Case for Applying
Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 1049 (1996) (asserting
that equality should trump religious liberty); Gila Stopler, The Free Exercise of
Discrimination: Religious Liberty, Civic Community and Women's Equality, 10 Win. &
Mary J. Women & L. 459, 472 (2004) (same); and, at one time, Ira C. Lupu; see Ira C. Lupu,
Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions:
The Case of Employment
Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 391, 431-32, 439 (1987) [hereinafter Lupu, Employment
Discrimination].
30. See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
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exercise rights, is untenable. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the
assumptions underlying the ministerial exemption no longer hold true. The
exemption was born at the height of separationism, a theory that treated
religion as distinct and mandated a wall separating church and state. In the
past twenty years, prevailing First Amendment doctrine has instead
emphasized equality between religion and its secular counterparts. Religion
is no longer considered as privileged as it once was, and free exercise
jurisprudence no longer presumes that religious commitments are more
important than all but the most compelling state interests. While the free
exercise clause still protects religion from intentional discrimination, this
constitutional distinctiveness does not require immunity from Title VII.
The lower courts that cling to the ministerial exemption fail to grasp these
changes.
Part III explains why the establishment clause does not justify the
ministerial exemption. Commentators who concede that Smith ended
religious exemptions for both religious organizations and individuals under
the free exercise clause nonetheless insist that the ministerial exemption is
necessary under the establishment clause, which denies the state jurisdiction
over doctrinal and theological disputes. They assume that adjudicating
Title VII claims would inevitably require the courts to evaluate a minister's
spiritual fitness-a theological question beyond the secular court's
competence. Yet, no one has examined Title VII lawsuits to determine if
this is likely to occur in all Title VII suits, let alone in most or any such suit.
I start by dismissing "procedural entanglement"-excessive entanglement
between church and state due to monitoring and related administrative
issues-as a vestige of the separationism era. I next demonstrate that the
fear that applying Title VII to religious institutions would lead to
"substantive entanglement" with religious doctrine is unfounded.
I
conclude by arguing that the courts' application of the ministerial
exemption raises substantive entanglement concerns that are equally, if not
more, problematic than those raised by a full-blown Title VII lawsuit.
Acknowledging the diminished force of the First Amendment religion
clauses, some commentators suggest that the First Amendment right of
expressive association saves the ministerial exemption. I briefly discuss
this alternate justification in Part IV. While the Supreme Court's decision
in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale3 1 presents a potentially viable justification
for religious entities whose religious doctrine requires discrimination with
respect to ministerial positions, it does not help those entities without such a
policy. Thus, to the extent that freedom of association provides a
constitutional basis for the ministerial exemption, it would be a much more
limited exemption than the one currently applied.

31. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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I. THE MINISTERIAL EXEMPTION

A. The Scope of the MinisterialExemption
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment
32
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
All public or private sector employers with more than fifteen employees,
including religious institutions, must comply with Title VII. 33 Congress
provided religious organizations with a narrow exemption: They may
discriminate on the basis of religion in employment decisions. 34 Congress
did not, however, exempt religious institutions from Title VII's prohibitions
35
against discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, or sex.
Title VII had been in effect less than a decade when the Fifth Circuit
held, in McClure v. Salvation Army, that a female minister could not bring a
Title VII sex discrimination claim against her church. 36 Billie M. McClure,
an ordained minister in the Salvation Army, complained that her church
paid her less and gave her fewer benefits than similarly situated male
ministers. 3 7 McClure also alleged that the Salvation Army fired her in
retaliation for her complaints to her superiors and to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission about the pay and benefit disparity. 3 8 The
Salvation Army did not deny these allegations or claim that the alleged
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 defines
sex discrimination to include discrimination based on pregnancy. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a). The statutory religious exemption originally covered only
religious positions. In 1972, Congress expanded the exemption to cover all positions,
religious and secular. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §
2(1), 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a)). The Supreme Court upheld the
expansion against an establishment clause challenge in Corporation of the PresidingBishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Two other
exemptions apply to religious organizations. First, religious educational institutions that are
substantially owned, supported, or controlled by religious organizations may "hire and
employ" individuals of a particular religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2). Second,
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees ... on the basis of [their] religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification [(BFOQ)] reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of that particular business or enterprise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l). The BFOQ is very limited; it applies only to hiring, never to
race, and is interpreted very narrowly to ensure the exception does not swallow Title VII's
protections. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1972) (stating that the BFOQ as applied to sex
should be interpreted narrowly). No court has yet ruled on whether being male is a BFOQ
for Catholic priesthood or other religious positions closed to women because of religious
doctrine.
35. Congress considered and rejected a blanket prohibition. See Raybum v. Gen.
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166-67 (4th Cir. 1985); McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972) (suggesting that both the language and
legislative history compel this conclusion).
36. McClure, 460 F.2d at 553.
37. Id. at 555.
38. Id.
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discriminatory treatment was religiously mandated. Instead, it argued that
subjecting a church to Title VII would violate the religion clauses of the
First Amendment. 39 The Fifth Circuit agreed, thereby creating the
40
ministerial exemption.
The Fifth Circuit's First Amendment analysis rested on principles of
church autonomy. Under the court's reading of Supreme Court precedent,
the religion clauses guarantee churches such as the Salvation Army the
autonomy and "power to decide for themselves.., matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine."'4 1 A central facet of
church government is the selection and oversight of clergy:
"The
relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood.
The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its
purpose. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized
as of prime ecclesiastical concern. '4 2 Title VII intrudes upon this
constitutionally protected relationship.
Thus, its
application to the
43
Salvation Army would violate the First Amendment.
Subsequent lower courts have invariably upheld the ministerial
exemption based upon this reasoning. 44 These cases assert two points.
First, churches have autonomy over church-minister relations. 4 5 Because
the selection of spiritual leaders is a crucial internal decision for a church, it

39. Id. at 556.
40. Id. at 553, 560.
41. Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. at 558-59; see also Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006)
("A minister serves as the church's public representative, its ambassador, and its voice to the
faithful.").
43. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560 (stating that the application of Title VII to the churchminister relationship "would result in an encroachment by the State into an area of religious
freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause of the
First Amendment").
44. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit rejected Billie B. McClure's lawsuit on the narrower
(and more questionable) ground that Congress "did not intend, through the nonspecific
wording of the applicable provisions" for Title VII to apply to the church-clergy
employment relationship. Id. Subsequent courts rely directly on the First Amendment. See
supra Part I.B.
45. The few courts to even acknowledge that free exercise rights may be overridden by a
compelling state interest have summarily rejected antidiscrimination as sufficiently
important. See, e.g., Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184,
185 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[Iln a direct clash of 'highest order' interests, the interest in protecting
the free exercise of religion embodied in the First Amendment to the Constitution prevails
over the interest in ending discrimination embodied in Title VII."); Rayburn v. Gen.
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that the
"balance of values" weighs against the plaintiff); see also Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2004); Minker v.
Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1974). The sole
exception has been for cases brought under the Equal Pay Act, where the courts have held
that the intrusion on free exercise was minimal. See EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781
F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Sch., 751 F. Supp. 700 (S.D.
Ohio 1990).
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is therefore a "constitutional imperative" 46 protected by church autonomy.
"Any attempt by the civil courts to limit the church's choice of its religious
representatives would constitute an impermissible burden on the church's
'47
First Amendment rights.
Second, this autonomy, insofar as it concerns the employment of
ministers, is absolute. Religious institutions are not only free to select
whomever they wish, but they need not justify their employment decisions.
"[I]t would offend the Free Exercise Clause simply to require the church to
articulate a religious justification for its personnel decisions. ' 48 Because
"the Free Exercise Clause 'protects the act of decision rather than a
motivation behind it,'"' 49 "it is the decision itself which is exempt-the
courts may not even look into the reasoning." 50 In short, the ministerial
exemption "precludes any inquiry whatsoever
into the reasons behind a
5
church's ministerial employment decision." '
This autonomy covers all aspects of the ministerial employment
relationship, not just hiring and firing. Just as the initial selection of a
minister is a matter of church administration and government, "so are the
functions which accompany such a selection. It is unavoidably true that
these include the determination of a minister's salary, his place of
assignment, and the duty he is to perform in the furtherance of the religious
mission of the church. 5 2
Application of the ministerial exemption is not limited to Title VII
claims. It has been successfully asserted as a full defense to a range of
antidiscrimination and employee protection laws, including the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 53 the Americans with Disabilities

46. Pardue v. Cir. City Consortium Sch. of the Archdiocese of Wash., 875 A.2d 669,
673 (D.C. 2005).
47. Id. at 673 (quoting Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167-68); see also Bollard v. Cal. Province
of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 1999) ("A church's selection of its own
clergy is ...[a] core matter of ecclesiastical self-governance with which the state may not
constitutionally interfere. A church must retain unfettered freedom in its choice of
ministers ...").
48. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946; see also Werft, 377 F.3d at 1103 ("If [the plaintiff is]
allowed to proceed, the Church would necessarily be required to provide a religious
justification for its [employment action] and this is an area into which the First Amendment
forbids us to tread.").
49. EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169).
50. Werft, 377 F.3d at 1103.
51. Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 802).
52. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972).
53. See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006); Clapper v.
Chesapeake Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, No. 97-2648, 1998 WL 904528 (4th
Cir. Dec. 29, 1998); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360 (8th
Cir. 1991); Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d
1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Sanchez v. Catholic Foreign Soc'y of Am., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1338
(M.D. Fla. 1999); Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994).
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Act, 54 the Family and Medical Leave Act, 55 Section 1981,56 the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 5 7 and a host of state antidiscrimination and human rights
58
statutes.
Furthermore, the ministerial exemption leaves more than ordained clergy
without a remedy. Rather than accepting the church's own definition of the
term "minister," the lower courts broadly define "ministerial employee" as
any employee whose "primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the
faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or
participation in religious ritual and worship." 59 As one appeals court
acknowledged, this approach "necessarily requires the court to determine
whether a position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the
church. '60 Under this test, the following people have been categorized as
ministers:
61

*

Press secretary for the Catholic Church;

*

Principal of a Catholic elementary school;

*

Director of music and part-time music teacher for a Catholic
63
Church, even though being Catholic was not a job requirement;

"

Choir director for a Methodist Church;

*

Kosher supervisor of a Jewish nursing home; 6 5 and

62

64

54. Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, No. 05-6301, 2007 WL 63714 (6th Cir. Jan. 10,
2007); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Rosati v. Toledo, Ohio Catholic
Diocese, 233 F. Supp. 2d 917 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
55. Fassl v. Our Lady of Perpetual Help Roman Catholic Church, No. Civ. A. 05-CV0404, 2005 WL 2455253 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2005).
56. Bogan v. Miss. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 433 F. Supp. 2d 762
(S.D. Miss. 2006).
57. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004).
58. See, e.g., Stately v. Indian Cmty. Sch. of Milwaukee, 351 F. Supp. 2d 858 (E.D. Wis.
2004); Schmoll v. Chapman Univ., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426 (Ct. App. 1999); Malichi v.
Archdiocese of Miami, No. 1D05-5108, 2006 WL 3207982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 8,
2006); Pardue v. Ctr. City Consortium of the Archdiocese of Wash., 875 A.2d 669 (D.C.
2005).
59. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th
Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id.
61. Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003)
(discrimination based on national origin and sex).
62. Pardue, 875 A.2d at 670 (discrimination based on race).
63. EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 803 (4th Cir. 2000)
(discrimination based on sex and retaliation); see also Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria,
442 F.3d 1036, 1037, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006) (addressing an Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) claim of music director and organist).
64. Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1999) (discrimination based on
disability); Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1175 (E.D.
Wis. 2001) (discrimination based on race).
65. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., 363 F.3d 299, 301 (4th Cir. 2004)
(discussing a Fair Labor Standards Act claim for unpaid overtime).
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0 Chaplain of a church-affiliated hospital. 66
Because "ministerial employee" has been so broadly defined, the ministerial
exemption extends well beyond houses of worship and has been applied to
organizations such as religious schools, universities, hospitals, and
67
retirement homes.
A handful of lower courts have permitted sexual harassment claims by
clergy notwithstanding the ministerial exemption. 68 To date, this remains
69
the only exception to the broad sweep of the ministerial exemption.
B. FirstAmendment Justificationsfor the MinisterialExemption

Supporters of the ministerial exemption do not always identify a specific
clause of the First Amendment as supporting the ministerial exemption.
Instead, they argue that there is a constitutional right to church autonomy,
viz., the right of religious institutions to control their internal affairs,
particularly church-minister relations, without interference from the state.
Different First Amendment clauses, including the free exercise,
establishment, and free speech clauses, might provide support. Each is
discussed below.
1. The Free Exercise Clause
When the ministerial exemption was first articulated, the free exercise

clause prohibited any substantial burden on religious practices, subject to a
strict scrutiny standard of justification. 70 Antidiscrimination law obviously

burdens religions whose doctrine requires race or sex discrimination. For
example, Title VII would declare illegal the Catholic Church's practice of
limiting the priesthood to men. Assuming this burden is substantial, and the
66. Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 361 (8th Cir.
1991) (discrimination based on sex and age).
67. See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., No. 05-6301, 2007 WL 63714 (6th
Cir. Nov. 30, 2006) (hospital); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2006)
(university); Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 301 (retirement home); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of
Am., 83 F.3d 455, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (university); Scharon, 929 F.2d at 361 (hospital);
Stately v. Indian Cmty. Sch. of Milwaukee, 351 F. Supp. 2d 858, 862 (E.D. Wis. 2004)
(school); Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad., 344 F. Supp. 2d 923, 925 (D. Del. 2004)
(school); Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (D. Colo. 1994) (school); Sabatino v.
Saint Aloysius Parish, 672 A.2d 217, 218 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (school).
68. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004); Bollard v.
Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999); Dolquist v. Heartland
Presbytery, 342 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Kan. 2004); Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C.
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694 (E.D.N.C. 1999); Malicki v.
Doe, 814 So.2d 347 (Fla. 2002); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991);
McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840 (N.J. 2002).
69. See Janet S. Belcove-Shalin, MinisterialException and Title VII Claims: Case Law
GridAnalysis, 2 Nev. L.J. 86, 123-25 (2002).
70. More specifically, the government had to establish the existence of a compelling
state interest and the absence of a less restrictive means of achieving that interest. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403
(1963).
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state interest in eliminating discrimination is not narrowly tailored and
compelling enough to justify this burden, it follows that Title VII violates
the free exercise clause.
This argument is not, however, the primary free exercise argument
espoused in favor of the ministerial exemption. Instead, courts applying the
71
exemption have relied upon the so-called "church autonomy" right.
Strictly speaking, the right of church autonomy, if it exists, does not derive
exclusively from the free exercise clause, but from the establishment clause
too and, perhaps, even the right to expressive association. Nevertheless,
courts have often framed the church autonomy right as a free exercise
72
right.
As conceived, the church autonomy doctrine declares that the state lacks
jurisdiction over a range of internal church matters. 73 Douglas Laycockwhose influential article 74 has been cited in several cases upholding the
ministerial exemption both before and after Smith 75-asserts that church
autonomy is strongest with respect to internal affairs76 but extends to all
aspects of church operations. Bruce Bagni, also regularly cited, 77 contends
that the strength of church autonomy is inversely proportional to the extent
that the activity at issue is secular. Church autonomy is therefore greatest at
a church's spiritual "epicenter," which encompasses worship, membership
policies, and the relationship between the church and its clergy. 78 While
lower courts and commentators disagree about the exact contours of church
autonomy, all agree that it includes autonomy from the state in church-

71. See, e.g., infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006); Gellington v.
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1302-04 (11th Cir. 2000); Starkman
v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1999); Combs v. Central Tex. Annual Conference of
United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 1999); Young v. N. Ill. Conference of
United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 185-86 (7th Cir. 1994); Minker v. Bait. Annual
Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
73. When lower courts have declined to hear Title VII suits against religious
organizations, they have usually held that they lack jurisdiction over the matter. See, e.g.,
Alicea-Hemandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2003); EEOC v.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 804 (4th Cir. 2000); Minker, 894 F.2d at
1356.
74. Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 19.
75. See, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655
(10th Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Little
v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 949 (3d Cir. 1991); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167 n.3 (4th Cir. 1985); Callahan v. First Congregational
Church of Haverhill, 808 N.E.2d 301, 306 n.8 (Mass. 2004); Williams v. Episcopal Diocese
of Mass., 766 N.E.2d 820, 825 n.3 (Mass. 2002); Alicea v. New Brunswick Theological
Seminary, 608 A.2d 218, 222-23 (N.J. 1992).
76. See Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 19, at 1403. Internal affairs include the
relationships between the organization and all persons who have voluntarily joined it. Id.
77. See, e.g., Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., 363 F.3d 299, 306 (4th
Cir. 2004); Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 463; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; EEOC v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 48 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511 (E.D.N.C. 1999); Jocz v. Labor and
Indus. Review Comm'n, 538 N.W.2d 588, 593 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
78. Bagni, supra note 19, at 1521, 1539.
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clergy relations and precludes application of Title VII regardless of whether
church doctrine is actually inconsistent with Title VII. It is sufficient that
Title VII intrudes upon the sphere of church-ministerial relations. As
doctrinal support, church autonomy proponents invariably rely on a long
line of Supreme Court cases in which the Court deferred to church
79
hierarchy in order to resolve disputes pertaining to internal church affairs.
When framed as a free exercise right, the right of church autonomy
essentially ratchets up protection for at least one subset of religious
practices: clergy employment decisions. According to proponents, the free
exercise clause does not just protect these practices from substantial
burdens, it shields them from all state interference.
2. The Establishment Clause
Courts and commentators also cite excessive "entanglement," which is
forbidden by the establishment clause, as another basis for the ministerial
exemption. The very inquiry into whether illegitimate discrimination
informed an employment decision is "entanglement" rife with risks to
religion. For those who view the establishment clause as a structural
restraint on the power of the state, "entanglement" represents the state
80
intruding into areas beyond its constitutional power and competence.
Though "entanglement" is a vague term, it can be divided into procedural
entanglement and substantive entanglement. 81 Both arguably arise when a
civil court adjudicates a ministerial employee's Title VII claim against a
religious employer.
A ban on procedural entanglement derives from the view that any
extensive or prolonged state interaction with a religious entity is itself
constitutionally problematic. For example, the Supreme Court rejected the
National Labor Review Board's exercise of jurisdiction over lay teachers in
parochial schools in part because it would entail pervasive monitoring and

79. See, e.g., Bryce, 289 F.3d at 655; EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213
F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 2000); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559-60 (5th Cir.
1972). The main Supreme Court cases cited are Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (deferring to church hierarchy regarding the defrocking of
a bishop); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of North

America, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (stating that churches must be free "to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of
faith and doctrine"); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929)
(deferring to church hierarchy regarding the appointment of a chaplain); and Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871) (holding that "whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law" has been decided by the highest church authority, secular
courts must not intervene but must accept the highest church authority's decision as final and
binding).
80. See supra note 19.
81. See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 311 (3d Cir. 2006)
("Entanglement may be substantive . . . or procedural."); see also Elvig v. Calvin
Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 956 (9th Cir. 2004); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the
Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999).
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extensive administrative cooperation between the Board and schools. 82
Procedural entanglement might even arise from a civil lawsuit because of
the "protracted legal process pitting church and state as adversaries." 83
In contrast, the ban on substantive entanglement seeks to prohibit the
state from inculcating, endorsing, or dictating religious doctrine. "The law
knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the
establishment of no sect."'84 In particular, the establishment clause forbids
the state from resolving doctrinal disputes or endorsing one religious vision
85
over another.
In theory, resolution of Title VII claims risks exactly this entanglement
with doctrine because these claims require the factfmder to determine
whether the religious employer's stated reason for its employment decision
about a ministerial employee was pretextual or not. This, some proponents
claim, may well result in courts passing judgment on the ministerial
employee's qualifications, and second-guessing the religious employer's
judgment as to whether she sufficiently embodies the church and its
teachings, in violation of the establishment clause. 86 As one court put it, "It
is axiomatic that the guidance of the state cannot substitute for that of the
Holy Spirit and that a courtroom is not the place to review a church's
determination of 'God's appointed.' "87
The court risks further entanglement if it orders the religious employer to
reinstate or promote a successful Title VII claimant. Because ministerial
employees help shape and develop doctrine, it is argued that granting courts
the power to decide who is chosen for such positions indirectly affects the
development of substantive doctrine. In addition, even the most wellmeaning courts are susceptible to error because they lack the competence to
properly evaluate the "gifts and graces" of a minister. 88

82. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 502-04 (1979).
83. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th
Cir. 1985).
84. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871).
85. See infra Part III.
86. Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11 th Cir.

2000) ("A church's view on whether an individual is suited for a particular clergy position
cannot be replaced by the courts' without entangling the government 'in questions of
religious doctrine, polity, and practice."' (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 555, 603 (1979)));

Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991)
("Personnel decisions by church-affiliated institutions affecting clergy are per se religious
matters and cannot be reviewed by civil courts, for to review such decisions would require
the courts to determine the meaning of religious doctrine and canonical law ....); Rayburn,
772 F.2d at 1171 ("Bureaucratic suggestion in employment decisions of a pastoral character,
in contravention of a church's own perception of its needs and purposes, would constitute
unprecedented entanglement with religious authority .....
87. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1170.
88. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
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3. Freedom of Expressive Association
A number of lower courts have suggested that the state should not
interfere with ministerial decisions because the minister represents and
speaks for the church.
The right to choose ministers without government restriction underlies the
well-being of religious community, for perpetuation of a church's
existence may depend upon those whom it selects to preach its values,
its doctrines both to its own membership
teach its message, and interpret
89
and to the world at large.
While lower courts have linked the church's right to select its own leaders
to church autonomy under the religion clauses, the value at stake-control
over the church's message-is a free speech value protected by the freedom
Consequently, some commentators have
of expressive association.
suggested that church autonomy in ministerial employment decisions can be
justified as a First Amendment expressive association right. 90
Freedom of expressive association protects expression, popular or
unpopular, from suppression.9 1 Suppression may result if the state meddles
with the internal structure of an association, such as by foisting an
unwanted member upon the association. 92 If allowed, this type of intrusion
would let "the majority ...

impose[] its views on groups that would rather

express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas." 93 So, while homophobia may be
unpopular, the Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts may reject a gay
man as a Scout leader because his presence would significantly affect the
group's ability to advocate its antihomosexual views. 94 Just as it would
stifle the Boy Scouts' expression of its opposition to homosexuality to force
it to accept gay leaders, it would, for example, stifle the Southern Baptist
Convention's expression of its view on the proper place of men and women
to force it to ordain women ministers.
Part IV addresses this expressive association justification, suggesting that
the issue is not quite this simple, while Part III examines the establishment
clause justification. The next section, Part II, critiques the free exercise
justification.
II. CRITIQUE OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE JUSTIFICATION

In analyzing the justifications that have been offered in support of church
autonomy and the ministerial exemption, I start with the traditional free
89. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167-68 (citations omitted). Other courts have adopted this
language. See Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1327,
1341 (D. Colo. 2000) (citing Rayburn for this proposition); Lewis v. Lake Region
Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 779 F. Supp. 72, 76 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (same).
90. See supra note 27.
91. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
92. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
93. Id. at 647-48.
94. See id. at 650-51.
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exercise justification, not only because it is the easiest to dismiss, but
because a discussion of its weaknesses is necessary to understand the
continued viability of the broader church autonomy concept. As explained
above, the free exercise clause was traditionally understood to bar
substantial burdens on religious practices unless a compelling government
95
interest prevailed.
The first significant limitation of this understanding is that it does not
shield religious organizations whose tenets are consistent with
antidiscrimination law. If an organization's religious doctrine embraces
racial or sexual equality, a Title VII lawsuit would not invalidate any
religious practice, but would merely declare illegal an act that does not
comport with church doctrine. Thus, it would not aid the vast majority of
church-defendants in Title VII cases that, like the Salvation Army in
McClure,96 do not require discrimination as part of their religion.
More importantly, the validity of any free exercise justification is now
suspect in light of the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.97 Prior to Smith,
religious individuals and organizations could be excused from complying
with a burdensome neutral law.98 Smith, however, ended free exercise
clause protection of religious practices against neutral statutes of general
applicability.99
95. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
96. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); see supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
97. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see Brant, supra note 29, at 302.
98. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (exempting the Amish from
mandatory school attendance laws under the free exercise clause); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (exempting Saturday Sabbatarian from an unemployment benefit regulation
requiring willingness to work on Saturday under the free exercise clause).
99. Smith contemplates two cases where the compelling interest test would still apply to
a neutral law of general applicability: (1) in hybrid rights cases, which implicate the "Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of
speech and of the press"; and (2) in cases in which the law allows "individualized
governmental assessment." 494 U.S. at 881-82, 884. The latter does not apply here and the
former has been widely criticized as unworkable and created merely to account for prior
precedent. In describing hybrid rights as "ultimately untenable," Justice David Souter
explained,
If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated,
then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule,
and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the situation exemplified by
Smith ....But if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an
exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law under another
constitutional provision, then there would have been no reason for the Court in
what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at
all.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Brant, supra note 29,
at 282 (hybrid rights are "jurisprudentially unsound" and "unworkable"); Kent Greenawalt,
Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospectsof "Tests " Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 323, 335 (arguing that "[m]ost scholars assume this language was a make-weight to
'explain' Yoder that lacks enduring significance"); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1121 (1990) [hereinafter
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In Smith, two men were fired from their positions at a drug rehabilitation
center because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at their Native
American church. 10 0 Because the men were fired for work-related
misconduct, the state refused to provide unemployment benefits.10 ' Under
the existing free exercise jurisprudence, they had a strong argument that the
denial of benefits was unconstitutional because (1) the law substantially
burdened the exercise of their religious practices, and (2) the state had no
compelling interest in forbidding the sacramental use of peyote. But rather
than reach the compelling interest test, the Court jettisoned it, holding that
the free exercise clause did not exempt religiously motivated conduct from
neutral laws of general applicability. 102
As the Court explained,
"Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for
religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law
not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs."' 10 3
Under Smith, then, the free exercise clause should not shield religious
practices from Title VII. 10 4 Title VII is a neutral law of general
applicability: It neither expressly nor surreptitiously aims to promote or
restrict religious belief, and it applies to all employers. 105 Therefore, just as
Smith could not invoke the free exercise clause to violate the drug laws,
even if his ingestion of peyote is religiously mandated, religious institutions
cannot invoke the free exercise clause to violate antidiscrimination law,
even if race or sex discrimination is religiously mandated.
Nevertheless, after Smith, lower courts have refused to abrogate the
ministerial exemption. 106 Instead, they have dismissed Smith as inapposite
by claiming that the free exercise clause offers two types of protection, and
Smith eliminated only the first: "The Smith decision focused on the first
type of government infringement on the right of free exercise of religioninfringement on an individual's ability to observe the practices of his or her
religion. The second type of government infringement-interference with a
McConnell, Smith Decision] (stating that the hybrid rights exception was "created for the
sole purpose of distinguishing [Yoder]").
100. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 879 ("[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."'
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
103. Id. (quoting Justice Frankfurter in Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940)).
104. Smith's elimination of the compelling interest test, see supra note 102 and
accompanying text, was informed by establishment concerns. These concerns, which are
discussed in Part III, are more difficult to rebut than the free exercise issues that Smith
essentially eviscerated.
105. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 656-57
(10th Cir. 2002); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 130204 (1 1th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Central Tex. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church,
173 F.3d 343, 348-50 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461-63
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
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church's ability to select and manage its own clergy-was not at issue in
Smith."'10 7 As one court explained, "The Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith does not undermine the principles of the
church autonomy doctrine.... [U]nlike Smith, the ministerial exception
10 8
addresses the rights of the church, not the rights of individuals."'
According to these courts, Smith limited free exercise protection of
religious individuals, but left intact the free exercise autonomy of religious
institutions. If that is true, the free exercise right of autonomy for religious
institutions is broader than the free exercise protection for individuals. As
conceived, it guarantees religious organizations autonomy from any state
interference in internal affairs, and should, it is claimed, shield religious
institutions from Title VII lawsuits whether or not antidiscrimination law
109
clashes with their tenets.
Lower courts also defend the continued vitality of the ministerial
exemption on the ground that there is "a long line of Supreme Court cases
affirming the church autonomy doctrine... [, and their] rationale extends
beyond the specific ministerial exception." l 0 The most commonly cited
cases include Watson v. Jones.-11 Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 112 Presbyterian Church v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 1 3 Gonzalez v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,114 and Serbian Eastern Orthodox
116
Diocese v. Milivojevich.1 5 All but one involve church property disputes.
Some commentators, including Michael McConnell and Kathleen Brady,
maintain that Smith affirmed church autonomy by citing with approval the
church property cases. 1 17 Other pre-Smith proponents of church autonomy,
such as Douglas Laycock, argue that Smith simply does not apply to
church-minister disputes."18
Arguments used to distinguish Smith and thereby maintain the ministerial
exemption suffer from several weaknesses. First, as a doctrinal matter, the
church property cases do not necessarily support a broad right of autonomy
from all state interference in internal affairs. Second, church autonomy as a
free exercise right depends on an unconvincing distinction between the free
exercise of religion by individuals and by institutions. Third, the continued
107. Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303-04.
108. Bryce, 289 F.3d at 656-57.
109. See supranotes 50-69 and accompanying text.
110. Byrce, 289 F.3d at 656-57.
111. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
112. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
113. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
114. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
115. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
116. See infra Part H.A.
117. See supra note 25; see also Berg, supra note 26, at 218-19 (noting that even after
Smith, "the Constitution still guarantees some special freedoms for religious institutions...
including the right to hire and fire clergy and the broader right of church autonomy").
118. See Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 Cath. Lawyer
25, 36 (2000).
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recognition of a broad right to church autonomy does not comport with the
changed view of religion in the new First Amendment paradigm that Smith
embodies.
A. The Church Property Cases
The church property cases do not stand for the proposition that a
religious institution may ignore or violate a neutral law under the aegis of
the free exercise clause. Despite occasional language that suggests a broad
autonomy,' 19 the actual holdings stand for a much more limited proposition,
namely, that the state should not decide doctrinal disputes. 120 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court's most recent church property case undermines support
for a broad right of autonomy. 121
To start, none of these cases involved an attempt by the state to enforce a
122
neutral law of general applicability against a religious institution.
Instead, they involved rival church factions laying claim to church property
after a split within the church, be it a local church splitting into two 123 or a
local church or diocese breaking away from its general church. 124 These
internal feuds pitted sect against sect-not church against state.
The Supreme Court decided these cases by deferring to the highest
church authority. In Watson v. Jones,125 the Supreme Court rejected the
English rule of awarding the property to the faction deemed by the court to
hold the "true standard of faith," and instead held that it would defer to the
highest church authority's decision on this religious question. 126 Similarly,
119. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
120. See generally Brant, supra note 29, at 293-95 (discussing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595 (1979)); Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the
Public Good, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 1099, 1112-14; Lupu, Employment Discrimination,supra
note 29, at 407 (also discussing Jones).
121. See infra notes 137-142 and accompanying text.
122. Shawna Meyer Eikenberry, Note, Thou Shalt Not Sue the Church: Denying Court
Access to Ministerial Employees, 74 Ind. L.J. 269, 281 (1998) ("First of all, the Supreme
Court cases relied upon by lower courts did not involve generally applicable neutral
statutes.").
123. In Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 717 (1871), the local Presbyterian
congregation split into two after the General Assembly, the ruling Presbyterian body, took an
antislavery position.
124. After the Russian Revolution, the Russian Orthodox Church in North America
declared its autonomy from the Russian Orthodox Church headed by the Patriarch of
Moscow. Both factions laid claim to New York City's St. Nicholas Cathedral in Kedroffv.
St. Nicholas Cathedralof Russian Orthodox Church of North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
In Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for
the United States and Canada of the Serbian Orthodox Church tussled with the Mother
Church, at one point declaring its independence from the Mother Church. 426 U.S. 696, 70002 (1976). Finally, the property dispute in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, arose after "two local churches withdrew from a
hierarchical general church organization." 393 U.S. 440, 441 (1969).
125. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679. Watson was decided before the Supreme Court applied the
First Amendment to the states, and therefore did not depend upon the free exercise clause.
Nonetheless, free exercise values permeate the decision.
126. Id. at 727.

1986

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

in Kedroff, the Supreme Court rejected the New York legislature's finding
that one faction would better carry out the church's mission and opted for
deference to the highest church body. 12 7 In Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 128 the Supreme Court preferred deference to the
highest church authority over scrutiny that would ultimately deprive the
church of the right to construe its own church laws. 129 Finally, in
Presbyterian Church, which involved local churches breaking away from
the general church, the Supreme Court invalidated a Georgia law that
required courts to resolve this type of dispute by deciding whether the
general church had departed from the tenets of faith and practice it held at
the time the local churches first affiliated with it. 130 Notably, the Supreme
Court did not actually defer to church hierarchy. 13 1 The sole case not
involving church property, Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila,132 did not implicate the First Amendment and does not support a
33
right of church autonomy. 1
In deferring to the highest church authority, the Supreme Court did
recognize a degree of church autonomy. But this autonomy does not
translate into a free exercise right of complete autonomy over internal
church affairs. 134 Animating the court's recognition of church autonomy
was not a free exercise concern for trampling on religious practices but an
establishment concern about the state entangling itself in theological
disputes.
Specifically, the Court wanted to avoid resolving these
disputes. 135 Therefore, it adopted the default rule of deferring to the highest

127. 344 U.S. at 106 n.10, 107-09, 117-18.
128. 426 U.S. at 713-14.
129. Id.
130. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440 (1969).
131. Id.
132. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
133. In Gonzalez, a testatrix bequeathed property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila. Id. at 12. Her will required that the gift be used to support a chaplain and that the
chaplain be a relative of the testatrix. Id. The Archbishop refused to appoint the plaintiff, a
relative of the testatrix, because the plaintiff failed to meet chaplaincy qualifications
established after the bequest. Id. The plaintiff argued that he ought to be appointed based
upon the qualifications existing at the time of the bequest. Id. at 14-15. The Court ruled in
favor of the Archbishop, holding that the testator could not have intended that a perpetual
chaplaincy founded in 1820 should be forever administered according to the canons of the
church that happened to be in force as of that date. Id. at 17. In deciding the merits of the
dispute, the Court rejected the Archbishop's claim that any controversy regarding the
appointment of the chaplain was a spiritual matter beyond the jurisdiction of the secular
courts. Id. at 15-16. Because the decision turned on interpreting the testator's intent, it does
not support a right of church autonomy.
134. See Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 19, at 1394, 1397 ("[Tlhe Court has
recognized a right to church autonomy in a series of cases involving disputes over control of
church property .... "); id. at 1398 ("This right of autonomy logically extends to all aspects
of church operations. Church labor relations rather plainly fall within the right of church
autonomy. Deciding who will conduct the work of the church and how that work will be
conducted is an essential part of the exercise of religion.").
135. Lupu, Employment Discrimination,supra note 29, at 407.
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authority as a means of deciding a dispute between religious entities
without having to determine which faction in a schism represented the
"true" church. 136 Thus, the church property cases stand only for the limited
proposition that courts may defer to church authority in order to avoid
determining matters of religious doctrine.
Even if these earlier cases had pointed to broad church autonomy, Jones
v. Wolf,137 the Supreme Court's most recent church property case, reversed
direction. 13 8 In Jones, the Court held that while courts may defer to church
authority to resolve disputes between factions, they are not required to do
so. 139 The Jones Court held that deference to church authority is but one
method of resolving a church dispute without deciding questions of
doctrine. As an alternative, the court could apply neutral principles of law,
provided that it "involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the
ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.' 140 In other words, to
resolve a dispute between warring factions, the courts may examine church
documents through the lens of the common law as long as they avoid
doctrinal controversies. 14 1 By eliminating deference to church authority as
the exclusive means of resolving a dispute between religious entities, Jones
seriously undercuts42any argument that these cases guarantee a broad right of
church autonomy.1
B. Religious Institutions Versus Religious Individuals
Besides its shaky doctrinal foundation, the survival of the church
autonomy doctrine post-Smith leads to an inherently contradictory position:
The free exercise clause offers no protection from neutral laws of general
applicability for individual religious practices, 143 but protects absolutely
institutional religious practices. 144 Religious organizations arguably foster
religion both by facilitating individual religious practice and by creating a
136. At least this is the rule applied to churches belonging to hierarchal church
organizations as opposed to congregational churches. All of the church autonomy cases
have involved the former.
137. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
138. Lupu, Employment Discrimination,supra note 29, at 406.
139. Jones, 443 U.S. at 605 ("We cannot agree, however, that the First Amendment
requires the States to adopt a rule of compulsory deference to religious authority in resolving
church property disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal controversy is involved.").
140. Id. at 602 (quoting Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 368
(1970) (Brennan, J.,concurring)).
141. Id. at 602-03.
142. Lupu, Employment Discrimination, supra note 29, at 407 ("The Court made clear
that the constitutional evil to be avoided in all cases is judicial resolution of questions of
religious doctrine and practice and that, in making efforts to so avoid, states may choose
between deference and 'neutral principles' as methodological approaches.").
143. This assumes the law was in fact neutral, and not merely facially neutral but actually
targeting religion. See Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
521 (1993).
144. In City of Seattle v. First Covenant Church, 499 U.S. 901 (1991), the Supreme Court
certainly suggested that Smith applies to religious organizations in vacating a free exercise
judgment in favor of a church and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of Smith.
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diversity of religious groups.' 45 While the latter may lead to some
heightened protection under the free speech clause, supporters fail to
articulate a principled reason to grant greater protection to religious entities
than to religious individuals under thefree exercise clause.
The strongest argument for the individual-versus-institution dichotomy is
that religious organizations serve another purpose besides enabling the free
exercise of their individual members. Specifically, protecting religious
organizations ensures a diversity of religious beliefs, which, in turn, is
essential to the health of a democratic society. 146 Democratic values may
be advanced in a variety of ways. For example, some maintain that a
diversity of religious groups best fosters civic virtue. Others suggest that 4it7
guards against religious tyranny or serves as a buffer against state power. 1
Of course, similar claims have been advanced about secular voluntary
associations, which are protected by the free speech right of expressive
association. As James Madison wrote, "Security for civil rights must be the
same as that for religious rights; it consists in the one case in a multiplicity
of interests and in the other in a multiplicity of sects." 1 48 Consequently,
distinctive treatment of religious entities stemming from their role in
maintaining diversity or a democratic society is, in essence, an associational
right. As expressive associations, religious organizations ought to have
some autonomy in selecting people who will represent them to the outside
world and convey their messages-in other words, they ought to have some
Nonetheless, as
autonomy in selecting their ministerial employees.
not translate
right
does
associational
discussed more fully in Part IV, this
into church autonomy or absolute immunity from antidiscrimination law.
Otherwise, the constitutional significance of religious organizations
depends upon what they can do for individuals. 149 After all, individual
150
believers often "exercise their religion through religious organizations."'
Allowing institutions but not individuals to violate the law in the name of
religious belief amounts to privileging the derivative right over the primary

145. The aims of free speech have been similarly described as allowing individual selfexpression and creating a diversity or marketplace'of ideas.
146. See, e.g., Brady, SurprisingLessons, supra note 25, at 1703 (stating that full freedom
of belief, even unpopular and unorthodox belief, is essential to the health of a democratic
society).
147. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Mandatory Collective
Bargaining Under Federal and State Labor Laws: Freedom From and Freedom For, 49
Vill. L. Rev. 77, 154-56 (2004).

148. Bagni, supra note 19, at 1540 (citing The Federalist No. 51, at 358 (James Madison)
(B. Wright ed. 1961)).
149. See Lupu, Employment Discrimination, supra note 29, at 424 ("[O]rganization[s]
might ... be viewed as exercising the aggregate rights of its [members], or as exercising a
derivative right to make choices that will enhance the free exercise rights of its members.");
see also Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (stating that "[s]olicitude for a church's ability to [further its religious mission]
reflects the idea that furtherance of the autonomy of religious organizations often furthers
individual religious freedom as well").
150. Laycock, ChurchAutonomy, supra note 19, at 1389.
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one. 15 1 The disconnect is apparent when the harm of state intrusion is
considered: Individuals may feel indignity or shame when prevented from
fulfilling religious obligations; institutions cannot.1 52 The rationale for
greater protection for institutions is especially strained when applied to
religious entities that espouse no beliefs requiring discriminatory treatment
of their ministerial employees, as it results in religious entities being
allowed to violate the law even when religious belief plays no role, while
the actual religious practices of individuals are unprotected.
The only reason the differential treatment is not completely unworkable
is that church autonomy is limited to matters of internal church affairs,
including the church-clergy relationship, which has no individual religious
practice analog. Were church autonomy not so limited, individual Native
Americans would have no constitutional right to ingest peyote during
sacramental ceremonies, 153 but Native American churches would have the
constitutional right to offer peyote to their parishioners during sacramental
ceremonies.
To justify the distinction between religious persons and religious
organizations on free exercise grounds, some courts and commentators
claim that the consequences of heightened free exercise protection differs
for individuals and institutions. In particular, they point to the Smith
54
Court's concerns that construing the free exercise clause to contemplate'
an exemption whenever a law conflicted with someone's religious practices
would result in chaos because it would "make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and, in effect, to permit
every citizen to become a law unto himself."'1 5 5 Yet, if the problem is the
potential for lawlessness, maintaining the church autonomy doctrine-and
by extension, the ministerial exemption-does not avoid this problem. As
with individual exemptions, allowing a religious institution complete
freedom in its internal affairs permits it to become a law unto itself. 156 And
instead of the slight disruption of exempting a single person from Social
Security taxes, 157 it means allowing an entire institution to withhold
contributions for all its employees.
In sum, any principled differential treatment between institutions and
individuals stems from the free speech right of expressive association, not
free exercise.
151. To draw an analogy, this would be akin to arguing that a newspaper had a freedom
of press protection against a particular search and seizure but not an individual reporter.
152. Lupu, Employment Discrimination,supra note 29, at 422-23.
153. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
154. Pre-Smith, exemptions were not automatic as no exemption was necessary for a
neutral law narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. See supra notes 21, 70
and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Eikenberry, supra note 122, at 281.
157. Cf United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denying a religion exemption from
social security taxes).
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C. The Change in Paradigm
Lower courts that cling to the ministerial exemption miss entirely the
fundamental shift in religion clause jurisprudence that has occurred over the
past twenty years. The ministerial exemption was created at the height of
separationism,1 58 the overriding mandate of which was to "prevent, as far as
possible, the intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of the
other."' 59 But the Supreme Court has since shifted from a view that the
religion clauses require treating religion as separate, autonomous, and
distinct towards a view that favors more equal treatment between religion
and its secular counterparts. 160 The shift is by no means complete, but
separationism's time has passed. Smith merely represents a continuation in
the shift towards neutrality in the free exercise context. 16 1 Thus,
distinguishing Smith on the narrow ground that it applies to religious
individuals but not religious institutions ignores the broader trend that the
case embodies.
1. Separationism
The theory of separationism insists on a "wall of separation between
church and state." 162 The separation is necessary because religion is
thought to be constitutionally special in at least three interrelated ways.
First, religion is uniquely privileged in that individuals' deep religious
commitments are of a different character-and are more important-than
other deep commitments that individuals might have. Consequently, the
state should value religious freedom over all but the most compelling
interests.1 63 Second, the state lacks all competence to deal with the
uniqueness of religion and religious doctrine. As described by Ira C. Lupu
and Robert Tuttle, "The core of the Separationists' message is a claim of
institutional differentiation. Secular matters belong to civil authorities and
sacred matters belong to religious authorities."' 164 Third, a more negative
view of religion's distinctiveness posits that religion's interaction with the
state poses special problems to both church and state. Church and state
must remain separate in order to "protect[] the 'garden of the church' from
the encroaching 'wilderness of the world' and insulate[] the political
158. Tellingly, the discussion in McClure opens with the observation that "[t]he Supreme
Court has many times recognized that the First Amendment has built a 'wall of separation'
between church and State." 460 F.2d 553, 558 (1972).
159. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
160. See supra Part II.C.2.
161. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
162. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Ass'n (Jan. 1, 1802), in Michael
W. McConnell et al., Religion and the Constitution 54-55 (2002).
163. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 27, at 1255, 1263 (describing premises of
Douglas Laycock and Michael McConnell).
164. Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
ConstitutionalOrder, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 37, 53 (2002) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Distinctive

Place] (discussing the basis of separationists); see also id. at 59 ("[lI]t is simply beyond the
competence of the state to decide for a faith group what its sacred teachings requires.").
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process from the jealousy and divisiveness caused by religious strife., 6 5
For all these reasons, religion needs to be separate and autonomous from
the state.
a. Free Exercise Clause
Each of three forms of distinctiveness informs separation-era case law.
The first form supports pre-Smith case law involving conflicts between
religious practices and neutral laws of general applicability. Examples
include decisions finding that the free exercise clause barred the state from
denying unemployment benefits to individuals whose religious beliefs
prevented compliance with the benefit program's requirements, 166 as well
as decisions exempting Amish 67children from mandatory school attendance
laws on free exercise grounds. 1
b. Establishment Clause
The second form of distinctiveness drives the courts' desire to refrain
from resolving doctrinal disputes affecting the division of church property.
The third form played a role in the separationism-era view that, under the
establishment clause, the state could not provide benefits to religious
organizations that it provides to nonreligious organizations. For example,
in several instances, courts held that the state could not financially support
religious institutions like parochial schools.16 8
In sum, while
distinctiveness supports the granting of certain privileges to religion that

165. Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and
Conceptions of the Self, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1468, 1469 (1984).
166. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding
that the denial of unemployment benefits to a religious convert who resigned rather than
work on her Sabbath violated the free exercise clause); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that the denial of unemployment
benefits to an applicant whose religion forbade him to fabricate weapons violated free
exercise); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the denial of unemployment
benefits to an applicant who refused to accept work on her Sabbath violated the free exercise
clause).
167. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (exempting the Amish from compulsory
school-attendance law because it interfered with their ability to practice their religion).
168. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding that the state cannot
finance remedial instruction by public school teachers to disadvantaged children in parochial
schools); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding that the state
cannot finance instruction to religious school students at public expense in classrooms leased
from religious schools); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (holding that the state
cannot finance funds for equipment and field trip transportation for religious school
students); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (holding that the state cannot finance
auxiliary services (such as counseling and testing) or loan instruction materials (excluding
textbooks) to religious schools); Comm. for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973) (holding that the state cannot finance maintenance and repair grants to
religious schools and tuition reimbursement or tax relief to parents of children in religious
schools).
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secular counterparts do not enjoy, it also prevents the state from conferring
certain benefits to religion that secular counterparts do enjoy.
169
2. The Shift Towards Neutrality

Over the past twenty years, the wall of separation has steadily crumbled.
Rather than treat religion as distinct, the Supreme Court has increasingly
treated religious and secular organizations as equals. Many commentators
have described
the change as a shift from separationism towards
"neutrality." 170 Of course, the shift is not, and cannot be, complete: The
religion clauses guarantee some distinctive treatment. Nonetheless, religion
has lost much of its special and privileged character. 171
a. Establishment Clause
The shift in paradigm has been pronounced in the establishment clause
jurisprudence. Subject to certain exceptions, the establishment clause no
longer prohibits government from granting religion the same benefits as it
does non-religion. 172
Instead, it is constitutionally sufficient that
government does not single religion out for special favors. Thus, if the
173
government creates a public forum for speech in public plazas,
universities, 174 or schools, 175 religious organizations may have equal access
169. When I refer to "neutrality," or a "neutrality paradigm," I refer to the practice of
treating religious and secular organizations alike.
170. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct, supra note 26, at 1802 ("By the turn of
the millennium, several of the building blocks in the edifice of Separationism had crumbled,
and a competing paradigm of Neutrality or evenhandedness between religion and secularity
had taken center stage."). Others prefer the term "equality." See, e.g., William P. Marshall,
What Is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and
Nonreligion in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,75 Ind. L.J. 193 (2000).
171. One reason for the shift may be the recognition that the growth of today's huge
welfare and regulatory state made separationism-never really a workable paradigm-more
impracticable than ever. For example, churches can never really be autonomous from the
state because they inevitably benefit from state-funded programs. There are simply too
many state benefits-ranging from roads and highways to police and fire departments-that
are too entrenched in everyday life for religious organizations to cut themselves off and be
truly financially independent. Others suggest that anti-Catholic sentiment motivated the
push for separation of church and state, and that these views have thankfully faded. For
instance, the Supreme Court noted,
[H]ostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that we
do not hesitate to disavow .... Opposition to aid to 'sectarian' schools acquired
prominence in the 1870's ...at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic
Church and to Catholics in general, and it was an open secret that 'sectarian' was
code for 'Catholic.'...
. This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000).
172. See generally supra Part I.B.2.
173. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (finding that
a private party was entitled to erect a Christian cross on the grounds of the state capitol,
which were designated public fora).
174. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that
a printing reimbursement for student groups must be made available to a Christian student
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to it. 176 Similarly, the establishment clause no longer bars state subsidies to
religious organizations. Consequently, the state may award social services
177
grants to religious organizations as it does to other organizations.
Moreover, in a complete turnaround from the separationism era,
government may now aid religious private schools in almost the same way
it aids nonreligious private schools.' 78 This reversal culminated in Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris,179 where the Supreme Court approved a school voucher
program even though nearly all of the government funds went to parochial
80
schools.'
The Supreme Court has not, however, embraced complete neutrality and
abandoned the notion that religion is unique. 18' Under a true neutrality
paradigm, the government would be able to inculcate, endorse, and fund
religion to the same degree as anything else. Despite the government's
freedom to, for the most part, say what it pleases, it may not endorse
religion. The establishment clause still bars the state from furthering
183
religion by displaying religious icons 182 or sponsoring prayer in school.
And while the state can directly fund secular enterprises, it cannot under the
establishment clause directly fund certain religious enterprises like religious

newspaper); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that university facilities must
be made available to a student religious group).
175. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that school
facilities must be made available after school hours for a Christian children's club); Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding that school
facilities must be made available to a church to screen a religiously oriented film series on
family values and childrearing).
176. In fact, the free speech clause requires it; to do otherwise would be to discriminate
against religious points of view. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
177. In Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the
Adolescent Family Life Act, which authorized grants to religious organizations and required
potential grantees to describe how they will involve religious organizations, did not violate
the establishment clause.
While government money cannot be used for religious
indoctrination, Lupu and Tuttle describe Bowen as "signalting] a change in the legal
landscape." Lupu & Tuttle, Distinctive Place,supra note 164, at 45.
178. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (overruling Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975) and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)) (holding that the state may lend
educational materials and equipment to parochial schools); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) and Sch. Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)) (holding that the state may fund remedial education
provided by public school teachers at parochial schools).
179. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
180. Id. at 653.
181. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct, supra note 26, at 1803 ("This
movement towards Neutrality, though sweeping, has remained incomplete.").
182. McCreary County v. ACLU, 544 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that the Ten
Commandments displayed in the county courthouse violated the establishment clause);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that a creche inside the county
courthouse violated the establishment clause).
183. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that student-led
invocations at school football games violated the establishment clause); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that nonsectarian prayer at school graduation violated the
establishment clause).
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worship, indoctrination, or proselytization.' 84 Religion also remains special
in that courts may not resolve doctrinal disputes-this lesson from the
church property cases still holds true. 185 The courts of today are no better
equipped to decide matters of church dogma than the courts of yesteryear.
b. Free Exercise Clause
The paradigm shift has also significantly altered the scope of the free
exercise clause. Previously, religion and religious organizations were
separate from the state in the sense that the former were not always required
to comply with the latter's rules. This privileged position was ensured by
the free exercise compelling interest test, in which any significant burden on
religious practice was subject to strict scrutiny. 186 No such test applied to
secular practices.
In the shift towards neutrality, religion has lost this privileged position.
Even before Smith abolished the compelling interest test, the Supreme
Court was moving in this direction. In decisions leading up to Smith, the
Court became less inclined to grant religious exemptions from neutral laws
of general applicability. Instead, it regularly concluded that the state
interest was compelling enough to override the free exercise clause. 187 As
Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager observed, free exercise
scrutiny was "strict in theory but feeble in fact."' 188 For example, at the
height of separationism, the Court found it unconstitutional to deny state
benefits to an applicant whose religious beliefs precluded compliance with
program requirements. 189 In contrast, shortly before Smith, the Supreme
Court held that because the government interest in avoiding welfare fraud
was sufficiently compelling, religious individuals seeking food stamp and
welfare benefits must follow state regulations, even where they clashed
with religious beliefs. 19 0 In Smith, rather than running through this
perfunctory exercise again, the Supreme Court simply eliminated the
compelling interest test. 19 1
184. Voucher programs are not considered direct funding. See generally Zelman, 536

U.S. 639.
185. See supra Part II.A.

186. Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-BasedInitiative and the Constitution,
55 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 31 (2005) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Faith-BasedInitiative].
187. As Lupu points out, it is a myth that free exercise principles were vibrant and strong
prior to being gutted in 1990 in Smith. See Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative
Codification ofReligious Liberty, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 565, 568-69 (1999).
188. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 27, at 1247; see also Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With
Accommodation, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 743, 756 (1992) (describing the free exercise
compelling interest test as "strict in theory, but ever-so-gentle in fact").
189. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
190. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (finding that a statutory requirement that a state
agency use a social security number in administering AFDC and food stamp programs does
not violate the free exercise clause, notwithstanding the belief that use of the number would
impair a child's spirit).
191. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. Even during the separationism era, the
Supreme Court revealed uneasiness in privileging deep religious commitments over deep

2007]

THE MINISTERIAL EXEMPTION

1995

Now, rather than shielding religious people and religious organizations
from generally applicable requirements, the free exercise clause protects
religion from being singled out for disfavor.' 92 This protection from
discrimination still marks religion as distinctive, since protection from
being targeted is not universally available.' 93 But instead of privileging
religion with immunity from neutral laws, the free exercise clause only
protects religion from discriminatory ones.
Of course, the free exercise clause always protected religion from
discrimination. As the Supreme Court noted, "it was 'the historical
instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those
who drafted the Free Exercise Clause.' ' 194 That principle is best
exemplified in modern times by the Supreme Court's decision in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,195 where the Court struck
down ordinances targeting ritual animal sacrifice, a principal form of
devotion in the Santeria religion.' 96 The City of Hialeah's intent to single
out this religion was evident from the history, language, and wildly
underinclusive nature of the ordinances that had as their ostensible purpose
the prevention of animal cruelty and the safeguarding of public health.' 97
Under one ordinance, for example, few, if any, killings of animals were

nonreligious ones when confronted with the stark example presented in Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 336 (1970). See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Spirituality,
Fundamentalism,Liberty: Religion at the End of Modernity, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 1197, 1227
(2005); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 925, 927 (2000) [hereinafter Gedicks, Defensible Free Exercise]. Congress
had exempted from conscription people who for religious reasons conscientiously objected
to war in any form. Elliott Welsh held deep conscientious scruples against war, but denied
that his views were religious. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341. Nonetheless, in a rather strained
interpretation, the Supreme Court held that Welsh was covered by the exemption. Id. at 34244. The concurrence is quite candid (and the dissent quite insistent) that the majority's
statutory interpretation was highly suspect. Id. at 344-67 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 36774 (White, J., dissenting). By exempting Welsh, the Supreme Court tacitly recognized that
deeply felt nonreligious opposition to war merited the same respect as a deeply felt religious
opposition. See id. at 341-42.
192. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993).
193. Religious individuals and institutions can be treated distinctly in two ways: (1) They
can be exempted from generally applicable laws that others must obey, and (2) they can be
protected from being discriminated against. Whether the latter should be considered a form
of "privileging" religion is an open question. In a way it is, because secular counterparts are
not protected from discrimination. But in a way it is not, because it simply ensures that
religion is not treated worse than its secular counterpart. In any event, the shift in paradigm
has ended the first but not the second.
194. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 532 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)).
195. 508 U.S. 520.
196. Id. at 542.
197. Id. at 536, 540-43 (stating that, though the ordinances were facially neutral, their
targeting of Santeria was clear given that they (1) were passed in an emergency session held
soon after the plaintiff church announced its plans to establish a Santeria house of worship;
(2) used the words 'sacrifice' and 'ritual'; and (3) were wildly underinclusive to their stated
goals).
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prohibited other than Santeria animal sacrifices. 198 Under a true neutrality
paradigm, bans on animal cruelty motivated by religious discrimination
would be treated no differently than bans motivated by a secular reason:
They would be subject to rational review. 199 Instead, the Supreme Court
applied a more searching scrutiny in Hialeah.200 This extra protection
demonstrates that religion has not completely lost its status as special.
c. Reaction to the ParadigmShift20 1
Even though religion remains special, this shift towards neutrality has not
been universally popular. Separationists who believe any government aid
directed towards religion amounts to endorsement lament the relaxation of
establishment clause strictures. 202 Others resist the downgrading of
religion's status, maintaining that the free exercise clause provides more
than just protection against discrimination. Religious commitments, they
insist, are more important than all other deep commitments, and therefore
demand additional protection from state interference. 203
Apart from the challenge of reconciling this view of religion with current
Supreme Court jurisprudence emphasizing equality between religion and
non-religion (including Smith), those who insist that the free exercise clause
protects against more than discrimination must explain why. 204 The text of
the clause-"Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion]" 2 5-is ambiguous enough to support either interpretation. 206

198. Id. at 536-37.
199. Social and economic laws are generally subject only to a rational basis level of
scrutiny. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
200. See Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 534 ("Official action that targets religious conduct for
distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial
neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is
masked as well as overt. The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of
governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
201. This section digresses from the Article's focus on the constitutionality of the
ministerial exemption within the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence. However, Smith
was so widely reviled I thought that this additional discussion would not be amiss.
202. Justice John Paul Stevens, for example, describes the voucher program approved in
Zelman as "authoriz[ing] the use of public funds to pay for the indoctrination of thousands of
grammar school children in particular religious faiths." Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 684 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 686 ("Whenever we remove a brick
from the wall that was designed to separate religion and government, we... weaken the
foundation of our democracy.").
203. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1,
16 (arguing that "religion is in some way a special human activity, requiring special rules
applicable only to it"); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 115, 151 (1992) ("Why accommodate religion unless religion is special and
important?").
204. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct, supra note 26, at 1806 ("Religion may
indeed be distinctive.., though we believe that the burden of persuasion should always be
placed on the proponent of distinctive treatment.").
205. U.S. Const. amend. I.
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The original understanding of the clause, assuming it matters, is hotly
contested. 20 7 Furthermore, as several commentators have observed, other
justifications for privileging religion are no longer persuasive. 208 "In a
modem, pluralistic world in which religion is but one type of ideology
among many, there can be no categorical claim that religion holds a special
place . "..."209
Religion is constituent of identity, but so are other deep
commitments. 2 10 Thus, the psychic consequences for not heeding religious
commitments compared to other deep commitments do not necessarily cut
more deeply. 2 11 Additionally, as discussed in Part II.B, while religious
groups further the First Amendment goals2 12of fostering diversity and
buffeting democracy, so do nonreligious ones.

206. See, e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 27, at 1270 ("The text of the Constitution is
seldom if ever dispositive of interesting constitutional questions. Neither is the history.").
For example, the Supreme Court has interpreted the exact same ambiguous language of the
equal protection clause to yield more protection for race than for sex. See, e.g., United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567-68 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the different
standards under the equal protection clause for race and sex, with statutes that discriminate
based on race analyzed under strict scrutiny and statutes that discriminate based on sex
analyzed under intermediate scrutiny).
207. Compare, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, A ConstitutionalRight of Religious Exemption:
An HistoricalPerspective, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 915 (1992), with Michael W. McConnell,
The Origins and HistoricalUnderstanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev.
1409 (1990).
208. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation:
The Regrettable
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 555 (1998)
[hereinafter Gedicks, Unfirm Foundation]; William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and
Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 308 (1991) [hereinafter Marshall, In Defense
of Smith]; Marshall, supra note 170.
209. William P. Marshall, Separation, Neutrality, and Clergy Liability for Sexual
Misconduct, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 1921, 1935; see also Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 27, at
1263 ("[R]eligious conscience is just one of many very strong motivations in human life, and
there is no particular reason to suppose that it is likely to matter more in the run of religious
lives generally than will other very powerful forces in the lives of both the nonreligious and
the religious."); Gedicks, Defensible Free Exercise, supra note 191, at 927 ("In this cultural
environment, it is difficult to justify giving religious practices special constitutional
protection that is not afforded to secular activities that appear to be just as morally serious
and socially valuable as religion.").
210. Marshall, In Defense of Smith, supra note 208, at 320-21 ("[R]eligious belief cannot
be qualitatively distinguished from other belief systems in a way that justifies special
constitutional consideration. For example, bonds of ethnicity, interpersonal relationships,
and social and political relationships as well as religion may be, and are, integral to an
individual's self-identity.").
211. See, e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 27, at 1262; see also Gedicks, Unfirm
Foundation,supra note 208, at 556 (asking whether a Sabbath observer's refusal to work on
Saturday should be privileged over the agnostic noncustodial parent who can only see his
children on Saturday); Marshall, In Defense of Smith, supra note 208, at 321 ("The violation
of deeply held moral or political principles may cause as much psychic harm to the believer
as would a violation of a religious tenet.").
212. Marshall, In Defense of Smith, supra note 208, at 321.
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3. The Effect of the Paradigm Shift on the Ministerial Exemption
As we have seen, notwithstanding the shift towards neutrality, religion is
still viewed as sufficiently special under the religion clauses to (1) warrant
protection from state discrimination, 213 and (2) warrant protection from
state intrusion in doctrinal disputes. 2 14 Thus, if the ministerial exemption is
required under the religion clauses, it must be within either of these two
rubrics. As I have mentioned, the concern about state intrusion in doctrinal
affairs is better viewed as a substantive entanglement issue, which is
discussed in Part III below. 2 15 The discussion in this section will address
whether the free exercise clause's protection against religious
discrimination necessitates the ministerial exemption.
a. DiscriminationUnder the Free Exercise Clause
Whether protection against discrimination supports the ministerial
exemption depends upon what kind of discrimination the free exercise
clause prohibits. At a minimum, the state cannot intentionally curtail
religious practices as in Hialeah.2 16 If the privilege against discrimination
is no broader than this, the ministerial exemption cannot be upheld on this
basis; unlike the ordinances in Hialeah, Title VII was not passed with the
intention of curtailing a religious practice. 2 17 If, on the other hand,
religious discrimination under free exercise is more broadly defined, it
could conceivably justify the ministerial exemption. For example, if free
exercise prohibited disparate impact, perhaps Title VII could be viewed as
discriminating against certain religions, such as ones that do not permit
women to be ordained as clergy.
The question, then, is whether the free exercise clause's bar against
discrimination is limited to intentional discrimination in the same way that
the equal protection bar against discrimination is limited to intentional
discrimination. 2 18 Endless commentary has been written about the
shortcomings of this approach under the equal protection clause. 2 19 It is

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See infra Part II.C.2.b.
See infra Part II.C.2.a.
See infra Part III.B.
See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
In addition, Title VII does not provide

for "individualized

governmental

assessment[s]," which would render a law not neutral and generally applicable under Smith.
See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990). Nor does
Title VII include general secular exemptions, which some have argued necessitates religious
exemptions. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark,
170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the free exercise clause requires religious
exemption from grooming requirements because the policy allowed an exemption for
medical reason).
218. See generally Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
219. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See ": White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of DiscriminatoryIntent, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 953 (1993); Charles R.
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well deserved, as such a narrow view of discrimination fails to capture
unconscious stereotyping or simple indifference to the disparate impact a
law may have. This myopic approach to discrimination arguably has the
same adverse effects on minority religions as it does on minority people.
The drug law in Smith illustrates this point. 220 The legislators did not
pass the drug law in order to burden Native American religious practices, so
there was no proof of intentional discrimination. Instead, the legislators
simply did not care enough to think through and prevent the law's
consequences for minority religious practices in the way they probably
would have for mainstream religions. (For example, when Prohibition was
enacted, Congress specifically exempted the sacramental use of wine.) 2 2 1
In other words, the legislators were indifferent to the effect the law had on
Native American religions.
Indeed, a central criticism leveled at the Supreme Court for abandoning
the compelling interest test is the potentially negative impact on minority
religions. 222 It is not difficult to see why. Before Smith, any substantial
burden on a religious practice, whether intentional or not, and whether
affecting a majority or minority religion, had to pass the free exercise
compelling interest test.2 23 Now, only discrimination against religion
(however discrimination is defined) warrants such scrutiny. Mainstream
religions are not as vulnerable as minority ones because they are less likely
to be targeted and more likely to have their needs taken into consideration
by legislators. 224 The Smith majority recognized the risk to minority
religions created by entrusting their protection to the legislative process,

225

more. 226

but only the dissent believed the Constitution required
But as a doctrinal matter, nothing in Smith or Hialeah lends support to a
broad view of discrimination under the free exercise clause. To the
contrary, the Supreme Court appeared to limit free exercise violations to
intentional discrimination. In Hialeah, the Court used the word "targeting"
Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987).
220. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
221. See Volstead Act, ch. 95, § 3, 41 Stat. 305, 308-09 (1919) (exempting sacramental
wine from prohibition), repealed by U.S. Const. amend. XXI (1933).
222. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 145, 155
(2004) ("The rule of Smith risks legislative indifference to the plight of unfamiliar minority
religions."); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. Rev.
221, 230 (explaining that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was needed
because Smith left minority religions vulnerable); McConnell, Smith Decision, supra note
99, at 1132 ("Prior to Smith, the Free Exercise Clause ...allow[ed] the courts... to extend
to minority religions the same degree of solicitude that more mainstream religions are able to
attain through the political process. The Free Exercise Clause, prior to Smith, was an
equalizer."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev.
195, 216 (1992) (arguing that the main flaw of Smith was "entrench[ing] patterns of de facto
discrimination against minority religions").
223. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
224. See Marshall, In Defense of Smith, supra note 208, at 318.
225. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
226. Id. at 919-21 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
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at least half a dozen times and repeatedly emphasized that the ordinances
intentionally sought to "suppress the conduct because of its religious
motivation." 2 27 The Court rejected a disparate impact approach in stating,
"[t]o be sure, adverse impact will not always lead to a finding of
impermissible targeting." 2 28 Instead, the Court analogized discrimination
under free exercise to discrimination under equal protection, 229 and
emphasized that "the ordinances were enacted 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,' their suppression of Santeria religious practice. '230 Furthermore,
a broader view of discrimination under the free exercise clause would
arguably vitiate Smith. Not only would most burdens on religion become
subject to strict scrutiny, but religion would also return to a privileged
position in the constitutional order, since religion would be protected from
every type of discrimination, but race and sex would not.
Although the jettisoning of the compelling interest test eliminated the
best defense against state interference, the situation is not necessarily dire
for minority religions. First, free exercise still protects minority religions,
like all religions, from intentional discrimination. 23 1
Second, the
establishment clause prohibits favoring a majority religion over a minority
one. 232 Third, legislators have proven quite sympathetic and responsive to
disparate impact on minority religions. As Marci A. Hamilton observes,
"[I]t is a fact that minority religions have done quite well in obtaining
exemptions in the legislature." 233 After Smith, Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act and enacted an exemption for the
religious use of peyote. 234 Thus, the willingness of legislatures to protect

227. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538
(1993).
228. Id. at 535.
229. See id. at 540 ("In determining if the object of a law is a neutral one under the Free
Exercise Clause, we can also find guidance in our equal protection cases.... [N]eutrality in
its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis." (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
230. Id. at 540. Only a plurality endorsed this particular section. There would have been
a majority opinion had Justice Antonin Scalia (or Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who
joined Justice Scalia) not taken issue with the plurality's focus on the subjective motivations
of the lawmakers rather than the object of the laws. But Justice Scalia did not quarrel with
the plurality's equal protection analogy in his concurrence. Id. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring).
231. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
232. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
233. Hamilton, supra note 120, at 1212; see also Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 27, at
1304 (stating that "the political branches have protected religious liberty more vigorously
than has the [Supreme] Court"); Gregory C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religions
Fare in the Courts: EmpiricalEvidencefrom Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev.
1021, 1023 (2005) (citing an empirical study that reveals that minority religions do not fare
worse in federal courts in the modern era).
234. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000)); American Indian Religious Freedom
Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
1996-1996a (2000)) (protecting religious ceremonial use of peyote by Native Americans).
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religious minorities may be greater than the Smith dissent thought. 23 5 This
may be particularly true after Smith, since the legislature can no longer
assume courts will create exemptions. 236 Fourth, as William P. Marshall
has noted, an exemption regime does not cure the vulnerability of religious
minorities.2 37 In applying the compelling interest test, courts must
determine the sincerity and centrality of religious beliefs, and a court is
more likely to find against a claimant when the religious practice is
unfamiliar or bizarre. "To put it in concrete terms, Mrs. Sherbert's claim
that she is forbidden to work on Saturdays is likely to be accepted as
legitimate; Mr. Hodges's claim that he must dress like a chicken when
going to court is not. '238 In any case, concern for minority religions plays
little role with the ministerial exemption, since the vast majority of
defendants who assert it as a defense are mainstream Christian
denominations. 2 39 In sum, the free exercise clause requires no exemption
from Title VII, a neutral law of general applicability passed with no
religious animus.
b. Resistance to Losing the Free Exercise Justificationfor the Ministerial
Exemption
Arguing that the state may ban a religious practice often meets with great
resistance. Those who maintain religion is still privileged, not surprisingly,
deplore infringement on religious practices. Even those who urge a more
equal approach to religion and non-religion still seem uncomfortable with
curtailing the ministerial exemption.240 Marci A. Hamilton, who so
235. While the Constitution may not requirethe ministerial exemption, it may still permit
the legislative equivalent. Some might argue that the RFRA, which legislatively reinstated
the compelling interest test, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a), (b), codifies the ministerial
exemption. See Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the RFRA is
available as a defense to an ADEA claim). Not everyone agrees. See id. at 114 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (arguing that RFRA does not apply to suits between private parties).
Furthermore, because Title VII must substantially burden a religious practice to qualify for
an exemption, RFRA's scope would probably be no greater than that provided by freedom of
expressive associations. See infra Part IV.
236. David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise Exemption: A
Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 241, 274 (1995) ("Proscribing court-mandated
exemptions should make elected officials more sensitive to statutory exemption claims,
because legislators cannot assume that courts will relieve conflicts between religious tenets
and secular laws.").
237. Marshall, In Defense ofSmith, supra note 208, at 310-11.
238. Id. at 311.
239. For example, my survey of the cases reveals that of those asserting the ministerial
exemption as a defense to a federal discrimination claim, roughly half were Catholic
institutions and a third were Baptist, Methodist, Episcopalian, or Presbyterian.
240. Interestingly, each argument employs a tactic feminists have criticized as
perpetuating gender inequity. Hamilton recreates the argument that women freely choose
their own subordinate positions-an argument regularly invoked to explain inequality in the
workplace-when she argues that women who choose to work for religious organizations
waive their civil rights. See Hamilton, supra note 120, at 1196, 1189. Eisgruber and Sager
invoke protection for behavior by characterizing it as private, a move feminists have long

2002

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 75

forcefully argues that religious entities should not be above the law and that
there can be no constitutional right to harm others in the name of religion,
nonetheless claims the ministerial exemption is justified because
"objections to the harm were waived by the adult's decision to accept
employment with a religious employer." 24 1 Of course, this kind of
reasoning would nullify all employment protections for everyone, from
minimum wage to safety requirements, and was soundly rejected with the
overruling of Lochner v. New York. 242

Eisgruber and Sager, who

persuasively explain why religious commitments should not be privileged
above other deep commitments, nonetheless conclude that religious
organizations should be allowed to discriminate on the basis of race and sex
because choosing a spiritual counselor is as private a choice as choosing
your spouse, lawyer, or psychiatrist. 243 While the choice of one's lawyer,
psychiatrist, and minister may well be a private decision, no one suggests
244
suspending Title VII for entities that employ lawyers or psychiatrists.
Part of this resistance may be a sense that more than just the free exercise
right to a discriminatory religious practice is implicated and that application
of Title VII is unconstitutional on other grounds. The next two sections
address entanglement and associational concerns.
I suspect, however, that establishment and free speech concerns cannot
fully account for all the resistance. Part of it may be traced to fears about
one particular religious practice, namely that lifting the ministerial
exemption would force the Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention,
and other denominations to cease excluding women from ordination. This
great resistance is somewhat curious given that even before Smith, the
Court had made it clear that a practice is not immune from regulation or
prohibition merely because it is a religious practice. Thus, the state could
conscript a conscientious objector whose religious beliefs forbade
participation in that particular war. 245 The state could forbid an Orthodox
Jewish military enlistee from wearing his religiously mandated
yarmulke. 24 6 The state could criminalize polygamy, a religious necessity
for Mormons at one time. 247 In the employment context, the state could
248
force a religious employer to violate its beliefs and pay minimum wage
or force an Amish employer to violate his beliefs and pay social security

challenged in contexts such as domestic violence and marital rape. See Eisgruber & Sager,
supra note 27, at 1248-49, 1276.
241. Hamilton, supra note 120, at 1189.
242. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a protective labor law as violating individuals'
liberty and right of free contract), overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379

(1937).
243. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 27, at 1248-49, 1276.
244. See Stopler, supra note 29, at 507. A megachurch's assertion of a right to intimate
association would seem especially problematic. For more on this right, see infra note 415.
245. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
246. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
247. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
248. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
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taxes for his employees. 24 9 The state's child labor laws could keep a young
Jehovah's Witness from her religious duty to preach in the streets. 250 All
these examples predate Smith, which banned a religious sacrament.
Despite this backdrop, courts and commentators still find it unimaginable
that the Catholic Church or Southern Baptist Convention might be required
to comply with antidiscrimination law.2 51 At some visceral level, it is
considered an impossibility. Why is this? It cannot be because a more
central religious tenet or greater burden is at issue. After all, for Native
Americans, Smith forbade performance of a sacrament, 2 52 and another
ruling potentially destroyed a group of Native Americans' ability to practice
their religion altogether. 2 53 The Jehovah's Witnesses believed their failure
to fulfill their religious duty would condemn them to "everlasting
destruction at Armageddon," 254 and the Mormons once believed that failing
to practice polygamy would lead to "damnation in the life to come." 255 Nor
could it be that the state's countervailing interest is less compelling with
Title VII. Ending centuries of discrimination seems at least as important a
goal as uniform appearance in the military 256 or a mandatory social security
25 7
system.
Part of the answer may be that these cases involved minority religions,
and for most readers, not their own religion. 25 8 Roman Catholicism or
Southern Baptism, on the other hand, are established, mainstream religions.
In fact, the Catholic Church, with over sixty-six million members and the
Southern Baptist Convention, with over sixteen million, are the two largest
religious bodies in the United States. 259 Almost 25% of Americans are
Catholic, and over 5% are Southern Baptist, 260 meaning that close to a third
249. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
250. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
251. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, Distinctive Place,supra note 164, at 41 ("It should not be
surprising that courts would be loathe to permit the civil rights laws to undo centuries-old
tradition of a male-only clergy in certain faiths."); McConnell, Singling Out Religion, supra

note 25, at 20 ("Most people would find it shocking for the government to tell the Catholic
Church or an Orthodox synagogue that it must hire women as priests or rabbis.").
252. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451-52 (1998).
Prince, 321 U.S. at 163.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1978).
Goldman v. United States, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986).
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982).

258. According to a survey of American religion conducted by the Graduate School of the
City of New York with a sample size of 50,000, approximately 1.3% of Americans are
Jewish; 1.3% belong to the Church of the Latter Day Saints; .6% are Jehovah's Witnesses,

and .05% practice a Native American faith. See Barry A. Kosmin et al., American Religious
Identity Survey
studies/aris.pdf.

12-13

259. Adherents.com,

(2001),

available at http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research

Largest

Religious

Groups

in

the

USA,

http://www.adherents.com/relUSA.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2007) (citing 2005 Yearbook
of American and Canadian Churches, National Council of Churches).
260. See Kosmin, supra note 258, at 12; see also Adherents.com, supra note 259 (citing a
2001 Gallup Poll reporting that 25% of respondents self-identified as Catholic and 6% as

Southern Baptist).
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of Americans belong to a religion that teaches that women cannot be
ordained. Furthermore, these two churches have a strong presence in most
of the country: The Catholic Church is the largest denomination in thirtysix states, and the Southern Baptist Convention is the largest in another
ten. 26 1 Because they are mainstream, they are more familiar and better
understood. And because they are more mainstream and more powerful,
they have greater influence on shaping cultural norms. Ultimately, it is the
difference between agreeing intellectually that it is wrong to forbid Native
Americans from observing their sacrament and feeling that is wrong to
forbid Catholics or Southern Baptists from observing theirs. The mere
suggestion is felt to be sacrilegious. Nonetheless, the Constitution does not,
in theory, protect Catholics and Southern Baptists more than Native
Americans.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JUSTIFICATION
Because the free exercise clause after Smith cannot justify the ministerial
exemption, several commentators have turned to the establishment clause.
Carl H. Esbeck, for example, observes that "critics of Smith, seemingly
reeling from their loss, are forgetting that a structuralist Establishment
Clause also affords considerable autonomy to religion and religious
Esbeck asserts that the ministerial exemption is
organizations." 262
necessary "because of the government's lack of power to regulate religious
societies in areas within their exclusive province, a jurisdictional restraint
that dates to America's disestablishment. ' 263 Others, including Lupu and
flows from the jurisdictional
Tuttle, agree that the ministerial exemption
264
limits imposed by the establishment clause.
Proponents of the exemption find the establishment clause justification
attractive for at least two reasons. First, unlike the free exercise clause,
establishment clause strictures cannot be overcome by a compelling state
interest. 265 Second, establishment clause concerns dovetail with concerns
raised in Smith. As Lupu and Tuttle observe, the establishment clause's
structural restraints "rest[] on considerations of judicial competence highly
akin to those on which Smith rests." 26 6 The Smith Court thought courts
261. Adherents.com, supra note 259.
262. Esbeck, Structural Restraint,supra note 26, at 101 n.435.
263. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 26, at 1583-84; see also Carl H.
Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a StructuralRestraint: Validations and Ramifications,

18 J. L. & Pol. 445, 462 (2002) ("The 'ministerial exemption' from federal and state
employment nondiscrimination statutes is also reflective of the reluctance of courts to thrust
their jurisdictional oversight into matters wholly within the province of religious
organizations.").
264. Lupu & Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct, supra note 26, at 1815 ("[E]cclesiastical
immunities are the entailments of the jurisdictional limitations that the Establishment Clause
imposes on the state's role.").
265. Esbeck, StructuralRestraint,supra note 26, at 3 (stating that while individual rights
under free exercise can be waived, structural limits on power cannot).
266. Lupu & Tuttle, Faith-BasedInitiative,supra note 186, at 34.
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should not evaluate the centrality of the exemption seekers' religious tenets
or balance their religious needs against the state's secular interests. 267 In a
similar vein, it is argued that the ministerial exemption eliminates the need
for civil courts to weigh religious considerations or resolve disputes waged
268
in religious terms.
The establishment clause unquestionably provides some degree of church
autonomy from state intervention. As explained in Part II, the shift from
distinctiveness to neutrality for the establishment clause is not, and can
never be, complete because even a threadbare reading of the establishment
clause prohibits the government from inculcating or endorsing religion or
dictating the content of religion. 269 Most obviously, the government cannot
run worship services or declare Christianity the official religion of the
United States. 270 Most relevant for the ministerial exemption, the
establishment clause bars the government from dictating doctrine and
spirituality, a risk run when the state becomes too entangled with
religion. 27 1 In other words, the government can no more say, "these are the
true and official beliefs of the Christian church," than it can declare
Christianity the official state religion.
Courts and commentators fear that applying Title VII to ministerial
employees risks exactly this entanglement. 2 72 They assume that in
adjudicating an employment discrimination claim, courts will pass
judgment on whether the plaintiff sufficiently embodies the church and its
teachings-a decision only the church itself is competent to make. 2 73 The
court further entangles itself if it exercises its power to reinstate or promote
a successful Title VII claimant. Some also claim, often under the rubric of

267. Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21
Cardozo L. Rev. 565, 575 (1999).
268. See Lupu & Tuttle, Faith-BasedInitiative,supra note 186, at 34; see also id. ("Smith
rejects the compelling interest test because that standard requires judicial evaluation of the
weight and import of religious considerations .... By comparison, the judicial decisions
refusing to intervene in internal religious disputes similarly renounce jurisdiction over
theological matters.").
269. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
270. The anti-endorsement prong of the establishment clause also means the government
cannot favor religion over non-religion, or favor one particular religion over another. See,
e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("The First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion."). Thus, a law cannot allow religious but not secular organizations to apply for
social service grants or allow Christian groups but not Muslim ones.
271. See supra Part ll.B.
272. See, e.g., supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then
and Now, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 1593, 1613 ("[O]ne of the most common rationales for
exempting churches' decisions concerning ministers from the anti-discrimination laws is that
such lawsuits would require courts to decide religious questions concerning the minister's
competence or suitability."); Lupu & Tuttle, Faith-BasedInitiative, supra note 186, at 36-37
(stating that the ministerial exemption avoids "judicial resolution of questions, such as the
qualifications of a leader or spokesperson, uniquely entrusted to the internal deliberations of
religious entities").
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"procedural entanglement," that merely forcing a religious organization to
274
defend itself against a Title VII claim violates the establishment clause.
This section begins by explaining that the theory of procedural
entanglement has been essentially abandoned by the Supreme Court and
therefore cannot support the ministerial exemption. It next addresses
arguments based upon substantive entanglement, which have more traction
since, at least in theory, the prosecution and defense of a Title VII lawsuit
could lead to courts evaluating issues concerning religious doctrine. But no
one has closely examined actual Title VII litigation to determine how likely
this is. As I explain below, were the ministerial exemption to disappear, the
prototypical situation regularly invoked by commentators and courts
alike-that of the secular court making spiritual evaluations beyond its
jurisdictional sphere and competence-would rarely, if ever, occur under
current Title VII doctrine. This section concludes by demonstrating that
applying the ministerial exemption creates as much, if not more, direct
entanglement with doctrine than applying Title VII.
A. ProceduralEntanglement
Arguments based upon excessive procedural entanglement-i.e., that any
extensive government interaction with the church is constitutionally
problematic 2 75-are no longer viable under the Supreme Court's current
understanding of the establishment clause. Like the ministerial exemption,
the theory of procedural entanglement was born during the height of
separationism. 276 Because it depends on the idea that church and state must
be as separate as possible, it has largely died in the shift towards neutrality.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 277 the Supreme Court articulated a three-prong
analysis to determine whether a government program ran afoul of the
establishment clause. 2 78 The last prong forbade "an excessive government
entanglement with religion." 2 79 At issue in Lemon were two state statutes
that provided aid to private parochial schools, including teacher salary
supplements. 280 Both statutes included monitoring requirements to ensure
that the state money was not diverted for religious indoctrination---or more
specifically, that the state-subsidized teachers did not teach religion in their
classes. 28 1
The Court invalidated the statutes, holding that the

274. See, e.g., supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
275. See supranotes 80-81 and accompanying text.
276. See infra notes 277-285 and accompanying text.
277. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
278. See id. at 612-13 ("Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion."' (citations omitted)).
279. Id. at 613.
280. See id. at 607-11.
281. Id. at 607-10.
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comprehensive and enduring surveillance 282 necessary to prevent any
unconstitutional diversion was itself unconstitutional entanglement. 28 3 In a
similar vein, the Court in Aguilar v. Felton284 found aid to parochial schools
fostered excessive entanglement because it required (1) pervasive
monitoring by the state, and (2) administrative cooperation between the
state and parochial school to ensure that the aid was not misused for
285
religious purposes.
Although lower court cases upholding the ministerial exemption still cite
procedural entanglement as one of the bases for its continued existence, 286
the Supreme Court has all but abandoned it. The move towards equal
treatment of secular and religious organizations necessitates this defection.
Once permissible aid to religious organizations was expanded, so too was
the need for surveillance to ensure the aid was not diverted to
indoctrination. 2 87 Relations between church and state, even extensive ones,
became unavoidable. Accordingly, in Bowen v. Kendrick,28 8 the Court
upheld social service grants to religious organizations, even though the
grantees' programs and materials were subject to state review and the
grantees themselves were subject to periodic visits. Similarly, in Agostini v.
Felton,289 the Court overruled Aguilar and found that unannounced monthly
visits by public supervisors in the parochial schools did not amount to
excessive entanglement. 290 In so doing, the Court emphasized that the
interaction between church and state was unavoidable and not automatically
unconstitutional: "Interaction between church and state is inevitable, and

282. Pervasive surveillance included invasive auditing of the school's financial records.
Id. at 621-22.
283. Id. at 619 ("These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring
entanglement between the state and church.").
284. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
285. Id. at 409-10 (finding that the school aid program necessitated an excessive
government entanglement with religion because public employees who teach on religious
school premises must be closely monitored to ensure that they do not inculcate religion); see
also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (asserting that the comprehensive system of
supervision will inevitably lead to an unconstitutional administrative entanglement between
church and state). The assumption that state involvement with teachers in parochial schools
would lead to entanglement also informed the Court's decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act did not
cover lay teachers in religious schools). NLRB relied heavily on Lemon and Meek. NLRB,
440 U.S. at 501-02.
286. These cases often cite Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,
which held that applying Title VII to ministerial employment decisions resulted in
entanglement "[o]n a procedural level" because of, among other things, a protracted legal
process and pervasive monitoring. 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985). Rayburn, in turn,
relied heavily on Lemon, Aguilar, and NLRB. Id. at 1170-72.
287. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988) ("There is no doubt that the
monitoring of [Adolescent Family Life Act] grants is necessary if the Secretary is to ensure
that public money is to be spent in the way that Congress intended and in a way that
comports with the Establishment Clause.").
288. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
289. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
290. See id. at 209.
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we have always tolerated some level of involvement between the two.
Entanglement must be 'excessive' before it runs afoul of the Establishment
Clause." 291 Furthermore, Agostini explicitly recognized the diminished
force of excessive entanglement in establishment clause jurisprudence,
acknowledging that mere "administrative cooperation" between church and
292
state, without more, now failed to create an excessive entanglement.
Agostini further downgraded procedural entanglement by eliminating it as a
separate prong for establishment clause claims and subsuming it within
another prong. 29 3 Notably, no Supreme Court decision in the past twenty
years has relied upon procedural entanglement as a ground for invalidating
a government program or regulation.
Whatever the forbidden threshold for interaction between church and
state, assuming there still is one, a Title VII suit against a religious
organization would not cross it. The Supreme Court has already approved
routine regulatory interaction with religious organizations 294 as well as
continuing surveillance by regulatory bodies. 2 95 In comparison, the
antidiscrimination inquiry is much more limited, requiring no extensive
intrusion or ongoing surveillance into the functions of a religious
institution. The sole question is whether an employment action was based
on forbidden criteria. 296 In short, it is the difference between "pervasive
supervision and simple prohibition." 2 97 If there is any entanglement
argument, it is not that the state and church are interacting,but that the state
is interferingwith religious matters.

291. Id. at 233 (citation omitted).
292. Id. Other shifts in establishment clause jurisprudence noted by Agostini include the
following: (1) The danger of political divisiveness warned of in Lemon is now insufficient

in itself to cause excessive entanglement, id. at 233-34; (2) the presence of public
schoolteachers in parochial schools is no longer considered to create a symbolic union
between church and state, id. at 223; (3) the assumption that teachers on parochial school
grounds would be tempted to inculcate religion has been undermined, id. at 224, 227; and, of
course, (4) the fact that government aid directly assists the educational function of religious
schools is not automatically invalid, id. at 225.
293. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000)
(stating that Agostini recast the entanglement prong as one criterion in the religious effect
prong).

294. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Hernandez
v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S.
290 (1985).
295. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-16 (1998); Agostini, 521 U.S. at
224. Both of these cases call NLRB into question.
296. DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 169-70 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding no
excessive entanglement in an ADEA suit).
297. Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir.
1993) (finding no excessive entanglement in an ADEA suit).
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B. Substantive Entanglement
Courts and commentators assume Title VII suits will lead to substantive
entanglement in two principal ways. 298 First, they believe that in evaluating
whether discrimination or true religious qualities motivated an employment
decision, courts will question a church's credibility and second-guess a
church's evaluation of a candidate's spirituality. 299 For example, the
Seventh Circuit declined to hear a discrimination suit brought by the music
director/organist at a Roman Catholic Church because the court assumed
that it would end up resolving theological questions beyond its competence:
[T]he church [is] likely to defend its employment action on grounds
related to church needs rooted in church doctrine ....

In this case ... the

diocese would argue that [plaintiff] was dismissed for a religious
reason-his opinion concerning the suitability of particular music for
Easter services-and the argument could propel the court into a
controversy, quintessentially religious, over what is suitable music for
Easter services
.... The court would be asked to resolve a theological
300
dispute.
Second, the ability of a court to compel an employer to hire, promote, or
reinstate an unwanted candidate compounds this entanglement and affects
the church's development of doctrine. 30 1 Both problems are exacerbated if
the court errs in its spiritual assessment of the plaintiff.30 2 As the case law

298. A third argument is that Title VII actions would unduly influence religious
organizations to make employment decisions based on litigation concerns rather than
spiritual needs. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[W]e
think it fair to say that the prospect of future investigations and litigation would inevitably
affect to some degree the criteria by which future vacancies in the ecclesiastical faculties
would be filled."); see also Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 798-806 (9th
Cir. 2005) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic
Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh
Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985). Because religious organizations are
not otherwise immune from lawsuits, a church that takes litigation costs into account already
makes employment decisions with litigation in mind. For example, if a ministerial position
includes driving the church van, a church may forgo hiring the more spiritual applicant for
one who has never been in an auto accident to avoid tort liability. Thus, "it cannot be that
the First Amendment prohibits suits simply because they have the potential to affect (or
,regulate') churches' hiring and firing decisions." Elvig, 397 F.3d at 792.
299. Lupu and Tuttle, who approve of the ministerial exemption, agree with courts that
"have consistently ruled that to permit adjudication of such pretext claims would be to invite
judicial second-guessing of institutional judgments about the performance of agents in
leadership roles." Lupu & Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct, supra note 26, at 1811.
300. Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 2006).
301. See, e.g., Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 19, at 1391 ("When the state
interferes ... with the allocation of authority and influence within a church, it interferes with
the very process of forming the religion as it will exist in the future."); Lupu & Tuttle,
Distinctive Place, supra note 164, at 91-92 ("Judicially-ordered reinstatement of clergy...
allows the state to influence the content of the entity's religious message over the objection
of those who are authorized to speak for the religious community.").
302. See, e.g., Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 19, at 1391 (discussing risks of
error on the part of secular courts); Lupu & Tuttle, Distinctive Place, supra note 164, at 63.
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often repeats, even the most well-meaning court lacks
the competence to
30 3
properly evaluate the "gifts and graces" of a minister.
An examination of Title VII suits in the next sections illustrates that these
fears are overstated because Title VII law is already structured to avoid both
problems. But before further discussion, it is useful to understand exactly
how a Title VII case unfolds. Because the vast majority of clergy cases are
individual disparate treatment suits, where the claim is that the plaintiff was
treated differently than other similarly situated people because of her
protected characteristic or protected activity, I focus on those types of cases.
1. Primer on Title VII Claims
Title VII claims can be broken down into three categories: harassment,
discrimination, and retaliation. To establish harassment through the
creation of a hostile work environment (the most common fact pattern), a
plaintiff must show that the harassment was (1) because of race or sex; (2)
unwelcome; and (3) severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and
conditions of employment. 30 4 If the plaintiff succeeds, the employer is
liable if the harasser was sufficiently senior to be deemed the alter ego of
the employer.30 5 Otherwise, the employer may avoid liability if it
establishes that it reasonably tried to prevent and promptly correct any
harassing behavior, and the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage
30 6
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.
To establish discrimination, the plaintiff must show that the employer
took an adverse employment action (such as firing or refusing to hire or
promote) because of race or sex. 30 7 These claims may be proven by either
direct or circumstantial evidence. 30 8 If the plaintiff adduces direct evidence
of a discriminatory motive and the factfinder credits it, the plaintiff will
prevail. 30 9 If the plaintiff lacks direct evidence, as in the majority of suits,
the plaintiffs circumstantial evidence is evaluated in a three-stage approach
known as the McDonnell Douglas test. 3 10 In the first stage, the plaintiff
must establish a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination by showing
that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the
position at issue; (3) she was rejected for the position; and (4) the position

303. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that the
"evaluation of the 'gifts and graces' of a minister must be left to ecclesiastical institutions").
304. See generally Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
305. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758 (1998).
306. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65
(1998).
307. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
308. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-100 (2003).
309. See infra notes 313-315 and accompanying text.
310. The test derives from the eponymous McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973). See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134-35
(2000) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework).
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remained open or was filled by someone else. 311 Next, the defendant must
3 12
offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision.
This is merely a burden of production and not persuasion, as the ultimate
burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff.3 13 Finally, the
plaintiff must rebut the employer's stated reason with circumstantial
evidence demonstrating that the defendant relied on an illegitimate reason
for its decision. 3 14 Circumstantial evidence of discrimination comes in
many forms, including the following:
" Evidence that the3defendant's
proffered reason was unworthy of
15
credence or false;
*

Evidence that stereotypical beliefs influenced the decision; 3 16

*

Evidence, including statistics, that employees similarly' situated
3 7
to the plaintiff received systematically better treatment;

*

Evidence that the plaintiff was not given the same opportunities
as other employees, including deviations from the employer's
normal procedures; 3 18 and

*

Evidence that the plaintiff was more qualified than the successful
3 19
candidate.

This is not an exhaustive list, 320 and the strongest cases are those in
which a combination of the above exists. "The key consideration is the
totality of these pieces of evidence[,] none [necessarily] conclusive in itself

311. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. A plaintiff that establishes these elements
eliminates the most obvious nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decision-that
plaintiff did not apply, that the plaintiff was unqualified, or that there was no position
available-and raises an inference of discrimination. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious
Discrimination,56 Ala. L. Rev. 741, 752-53 (2005).
312. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
313. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
314. Raytheon Co. v. Hemandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49-50, 49 n.3 (2003).
315. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-48; see also id. at 147 ("Proof that the defendant's
explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is
probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive ....
[O]nce the
employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely
alternative explanation ...").
316. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (asserting that "stereotyped
remarks [by decision-makers] can certainly be evidence that gender played a part").
317. Walker v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 410 F.3d 387, 394 (7th Cir.
2005).
318. See, e.g., Holt v. KMI-Cont., Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1996); Hart, supra note
311, at 751.
319. Hart, supra note 311, at 751.
320. Other evidence that may be helpful but perhaps not enough on its own includes a
discriminatory atmosphere, see, e.g., Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217
F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2000), or statistical evidence about the percentage of women in the
workforce that suggests an unwillingness to hire women or a tendency to segregate them into
lower-status jobs, Hart, supra note 311, at 752.
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but together composing a convincing mosaic of discrimination against the
plaintiff."'32 1 The defendant is liable if the factfinder concludes that
plaintiff provided sufficient circumstantial evidence that race or sex was a
motivating factor in the adverse action. 322 The fact that the employer may
323
also have had legitimate reasons may limit the remedy, but not liability.
Finally, to establish retaliation, the plaintiff must show that the employer
took adverse action because the employee "has opposed any practice made
an unlawful employment practice" by the Act. 324 Statutorily protected
activity includes complaining to superiors about discrimination or
harassment in the workplace, lodging complaints with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and filing or participating
in a discrimination lawsuit. As with discrimination claims, a plaintiff may
prove retaliation either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence
using the McDonnell Douglas approach.
A plaintiff relying on
circumstantial evidence establishes her prima facie retaliation claim by
showing that (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) she suffered a
materially adverse action, 325 and (3) there was a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse action. 326 Once the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the challenged
employment action, and then back to the plaintiff to rebut this claim.
Again, the ultimate burden of persuasion rests on the plaintiffs
327
shoulders.

321. Walker, 410 F.3d at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted).
322. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, liability may be established "even though other
factors also motivated the [adverse] practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). Note that
while employment decisions were originally understood as either the result of legitimate
criteria or of illegitimate ones, Price Waterhouse acknowledged that a decision may be
informed by both, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 expressly stated that such "mixed
motives" decisions were illegal. See, e.g., Russell v. Microdyne, 65 F.3d 1229, 1235-37 (4th
Cir. 1995) (explaining how the Civil Rights Act of 1991 explicitly provided that employment
decisions based on discrimination violated Title VII even if legitimate factors were also
involved in the decision).
323. If an employer demonstrates that it "would have taken the same action in the absence
of the impermissible motivating factor," the court "shall not award damages or issue an order
requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g)(2)(B).
324. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
325. The Supreme Court defined this as an action that might have "dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Burlington N. &
Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also, e.g., Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1171
(10th Cir. 2006).
326. See, e.g., Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Causation
sufficient to establish the third element of the prima facie case may be inferred from
circumstantial evidence, such as the employer's knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in
protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly
retaliatory employment decision.").
327. Id. (citing Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
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2. The Risk that Courts Will Substitute Their Judgment for That of
Religious Institutions on Matters of Spirituality and Doctrine
Title VII ministerial employee suits can be decided without the court
substituting its judgment for that of the religious institution on spiritual and
Supporters of the ministerial exemption assume
doctrinal matters.
mistakenly that religious employers always defend a discrimination suit by
asserting a religious reason such as "lack of spirituality" or
"misunderstanding theology." But some suits do not involve religious
disputes at all,32 8 and in others, the religious reason can be objectively
tested. 32 9 Moreover, they overlook a substantial body of Title VII
jurisprudence that already ensures that courts evaluate only matters within
their competence. 330 To illustrate these points, I have categorized by
employer's defense potential Title VII lawsuits brought by ministers:

Type A

Defendant does not deny discrimination but
asserts that its religious doctrine requires such
natndiscrimination.
e.g., "because they are head of household, we

None

must pay married men more than married

Type B

Type C
Type D

women."
Defendant denies discrimination but does not
assert a religious justification.
e.g., "sexualharassmentdid not occur"

Defendant denies discrimination and asserts
objectively testable religious justification.
e.g., "plaintiffviolated tenet againstadultery"
Defendant denies discrimination and asserts
subjective religious justification.

None

None

Low

e.g., "plaintifflacked requisitespirituality"
Contrary to lower courts' and commentators' assumptions, not all Title
VII cases will be defended on religious grounds. In addition, not all
religious-based defenses raise questions about religious doctrine or
spirituality. As indicated in the last column and as explained below, the
risk of deciding a religious issue exists only in the last category of cases
and, even then, the risk is not sufficiently high to warrant a prophylactic
measure such as the ministerial exemption.

328. See infra Part III.B.2.a-b.
329. See infra Part III.B.2.c.
330. See infra notes 351-357 and accompanying text.
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a. Type A Cases: Defendant's Religion Requires Discrimination
In Type A and B cases, the court cannot entangle itself in religious
controversies because there are no religious questions to decide. Though it
may sound counterintuitive at first, cases in which the defendant religious
organization overtly discriminates based upon religious doctrine do not
implicate religious questions. If the risk posed by a Title VII claim is that
judging whether an employment decision was based on race or sex rather
than true qualifications will require a court to determine a religious
organization's tenets and who best embodies them, that risk disappears
where the religious organization admits that sex or race played a role. For
example, if a religious organization states that according to its tenets,
married men are the head of household and therefore are paid more than
married women, 331 it has conceded discrimination. The court can find that
it violated Title VII while deferring completely to the religious organization
on doctrinal questions.
One might argue, however, that by preventing the church from realizing
its doctrinal requirements, whether it be an all-male clergy or higher
compensation for married men versus married women, the state will subtly
332
force the church to conform its religious doctrine to the state's values.
But under this reasoning, the state could never declare a religious practice
illegal, and that is clearly not the case after Smith. 333 In allowing Title VII
claims against religious organizations, the court is not declaring that
antidiscrimination represents an organization's true beliefs. It is merely
declaring that antidiscrimination is the secular law and must be complied
with. Whatever indirect influence the state may have on the development
of religious doctrine, 334 it does not equate to authoritatively declaring its
content, and it is the latter that violates the establishment clause.

331. The EEOC has successfully sued religious schools for such practices under the Equal
Pay Act. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); EEOC
v. Tree of Life Christian Schs., 751 F. Supp. 700 (S.D. Ohio 1990). These cases did not rule
on whether the ministerial exemption applied.
332. See, e.g., Mark E. Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L.

Rev. 1089 (2003) (arguing that imposing secular duties in church sex abuse cases risks
subtly altering the church's internal structure). A related complaint is that the remedy of
reinstatement, which changes the makeup of the clergy, also subtly affects church doctrine
because clergy may have the power to shape doctrinal development. This forced inclusion
raises expressive association concerns, which are addressed in Part IV.
333. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
334. In any event, state influence is inevitable. One could equally argue that the
ministerial exemption has inhibited the development of religious doctrine towards more
egalitarian beliefs. Responding to a similar claim in the free speech context, Andrew
Koppelman argues that even if antidiscrimination law influences attitudes, and even if done
intentionally, it does not mean that it violates the First Amendment: "People's preferences
are inevitably shaped in nonrational ways by their environment, and law is part of that
environment." Andrew Koppelman, Should Noncommercial Associations Have an Absolute
Right to Discriminate?,67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 27, 57 (2004).
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b. Type B Cases: Defendant Offers No Religious Justification
The court does not entangle itself in religious doctrine if the defendant
offers no religious justification for its employment decision.3 35 For
example, sexual harassment claims sidestep religion entirely, as an
organization is unlikely to claim that its religion requires sexual harassment.
Immunity from suits seems particularly inappropriate on entanglement
grounds in any case where no religious reason is proffered.
Not
surprisingly, clergy sexual harassment claims are the one instance where
336
lower courts have declined to apply the ministerial exemption.
A few dissenters, however, raise concerns about entanglement during the
affirmative defense phase. In response to a hostile work environment
claim, the religious institution can avoid liability if it proves that it
exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually
harassing behavior, and that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take
advantage of help provided by the employer. 337 But what is reasonable to a
secular employer may not be to a religious one, as church doctrine often
dictates the appropriate response to clergy misconduct.
So, strictly
speaking, this is not a case where religion never comes into play: The
church's response may be "bound up in questions of religious doctrine
about reconciliation, restoration, and penance. ' 338 Analogous arguments
have arisen in sex abuse cases. 3 39 In one child molestation case, for
example, the defendant Roman Catholic Church argued that canon law
limited the church's ability to discipline priests. In particular, the Catholic
belief in redemption and forgiveness prohibited the Catholic Church from
summarily punishing abusive priests. 34 0 The rebuttal is the same for both,
and echoes the rebuttal to religious organizations with discriminatory
tenets: If the organization's beliefs require sexual harassment (or abuse) or
require what would be an unreasonable response to a complaint of sexual
harassment (or abuse) in the secular world, then the practice is illegal. As
discussed above, declaring a religious practice illegal does not lead to
entanglement because the court is not telling a church what its beliefs are;

335. See, e.g., Eikenberry, supra note 122, at 269.
336. See supra note 68. Sexual harassment claims actually avoid both entanglement

risks: There is no second-guessing of spirituality judgments, and the remedy is limited to
damages.
337. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
338. Chopko, supra note 332, at 1116; see also Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious
Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 Ind. L.J. 219, 228, 231 (2000)

(claiming that tort liability violates First Amendment because the "court's ultimate
determination may be tantamount to a state imprimatur-an official pronouncement on what
is, and what is not, a reasonable interpretation and expression of the religious tradition in
question").
339. See, e.g., Eikenberry, supra note

122, at 289 (1998)

exemption cases to clergy sex abuse cases).
340. Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 78 (D.R.I. 1997).

(comparing ministerial
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rather, it is merely telling it that its practices are not allowed under the
34
law. 1
c. Type C Cases: Defendant Offers an Objective Religious Justification
The third category of cases that avoid entanglement are those in which
the defendant offers an objective religious reason for the employment
decision. Contrary to lower court and commentator assumptions, not all
cases defended on religious grounds turn on subjective judgments about the
plaintiff s spirituality. Instead, many are defended on religious grounds that
are specific, objective, and easily tested.
A common defense pleaded by religious organizations is that the plaintiff
failed to adhere to a particular religious tenet. For example, though Title
VII sex discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy, several
religious schools terminated female schoolteachers who became pregnant
outside of marriage. 34 2 The schools argued that the teachers serve as
religious role models for their students 343 and that the plaintiffs' violation
of religious proscriptions against extramarital sex-a prohibition that
applies equally to men and women-rendered them unsuitable role
344
models.
In these cases, the issue of whether sex discrimination has occurred
depends upon whether the schools applied the religious policy equally to
male and female teachers. Assuming that violation of a religious tenet is a
legitimate reason for discharge, 34 5 punishing only women and not men for
the same violation constitutes sex discrimination. 346 "Religious codes of
morality must be applied equally to male and female teachers." 34 7 Courts
have allowed claims brought by lay teachers because the court need not
341. And of course, Smith makes clear that the state may declare even a sacramental
religious practice illegal.
342. Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2000) (newly married
teacher who began to show immediately after marriage did not have her contract renewed by
a Catholic school); Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1996)
(single teacher fired by a Church of Christ school after she became pregnant); Redhead v.
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (unmarried
pregnant teacher fired by a Seventh-Day Adventist school); Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch.,
995 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (single pregnant teacher fired from a church-affiliated
school); Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (school librarian
fired by fundamentalist Christian school due to her out-of-wedlock pregnancy); Dolter v.
Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (unmarried pregnant teacher filed by
a parochial school).
343. Cf NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979) (finding that the role
of a teacher in fulfilling the mission of a religious school is "critical and unique").
344. In other words, the defendant religious schools did not argue that their religious
beliefs required sex discrimination, such as a belief that mothers of preschool children
should stay home with their children or a belief that extramarital affairs were sinful for
women alone.
345. While this discharge would not be protected by free exercise, it might be covered by
freedom of expressive association. See infra Part IV.
346. See, e.g., Cline, 206 F.3d at 666-67.
347. Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 348.
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resolve doctrinal disputes or otherwise evaluate the religious merit of the
proffered reason: No one questions the school's religious belief that sex
outside marriage is forbidden. The court need not evaluate the plaintiffs
spirituality because no one disputes that she engaged in forbidden conduct.
The only question to be decided falls well within the competence of the
courts: determining whether the plaintiffs evidence established that men
and women were treated the same on this issue. The outcomes of these
suits have varied, 34 8 but in no case has a court found unconstitutional
entanglement. The analysis is no different if a religious (ministerial)
teacher rather than a lay (non-ministerial) teacher is the plaintiff. Nor
would it be different if the proffered reason were adultery or some other
objectively verifiable violation of a religious tenet.
Nonetheless, many lower courts express great reluctance about ruling on
the credibility of a religious reason. 349 This discomfort is misplaced. Take
another example: A divorced teacher at a religious school is fired after she
helps a colleague with a sexual harassment suit against the school. The
teacher files a Title VII retaliation suit, and the school claims that it
terminated the plaintiff because she violated its religious proscription
against divorce. In ruling on the credibility of this proffered reason, it is
important to be clear about what the court is deciding. The court is not
deciding the ultimate truth of a religious belief, i.e., whether divorce is
sinful or not. It is not even deciding whether the school's religion in fact
espouses that divorce is wrong. Both would entangle the court in questions
of doctrine. But this is not what courts do. Instead, the court is deciding
whether, assuming the school's religion condemns divorce, this
condemnation motivated the termination, or whether it was motivated by
illegal retaliation for protected conduct, or both. 350 There is nothing
inherently entangling about asking whether a religious reason was in fact
the sole reason motivating a decision.

348. Compare Cline, 206 F.3d at 667 (holding that a plaintiff survived summary
judgment because she produced evidence that the policy was not applied equally among men
and women-school officials "acknowledged in their depositions that Cline's pregnancy
alone had signaled them that she engaged in premarital sex, and that the school does not
otherwise inquire as to whether male teachers engage in premarital sex"), with Boyd v.
Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F. 3d 410, 412 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that the plaintiff
failed to establish discrimination because the president of the school terminated men and
women for sexual immorality, and no instances of extramarital sex went unpunished).
349. This reluctance is particularly acute with courts that still fear "procedural
entanglement," which as discussed supra Part III.A, has faded as a constitutional concern.
350. As with the pregnant teachers, the plaintiff could show that similarly situated
teachers were treated differently, i.e., other divorced teachers had not been fired.
Alternatively, she could establish that the school did not discover she was divorced until
after deciding to terminate her. In the further alternative, she could establish that her
marriage did not end in divorce but annulment, and that the school deviated from standard
procedures by denying her the usual pretermination hearing. All of these arguments may be
asserted without putting into issue the validity, truthfulness, or substance of Catholic
religious teaching, in other words, without entangling the state in questions of dogma or
spirituality.
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Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has stated that scrutinizing a
religious organization's proffered religious reason does not automatically
result in entanglement. In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton
Christian Schools, Inc.,351 a born-again Christian school told a pregnant
teacher she could not return the following year because of its religious
belief that mothers should stay home with their preschool children. When
the teacher threatened litigation, the school fired her for violating an
internal dispute resolution provision in her contract, which stemmed from
the school's religious belief that Christians should not take other Christians
into secular courts. 352 The Sixth Circuit enjoined a state administrative
action in part because exercising jurisdiction in this matter would result in
excessive entanglement under the establishment clause. 353 The Supreme
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, ruling that it should have abstained since
the state court could address the constitutional issues. 3 54 The Court added,
"[T]he Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely investigating
the circumstances of [the schoolteacher's] discharge in this case, if only to
ascertain whether the ascribed religious-based reason was in fact the reason
355
for the discharge."
d. Type D Cases: Defendant Offers a Subjective ReligiousJustification
It is the final category that skirts closest to entanglement-Title VII cases
in which the religious reason proffered is that the plaintiff was not hired
because she lacked the requisite spirituality, could not properly interpret
church doctrine, or failed to meet some other subjective religious
qualification that cannot be easily tested and neatly rebutted. 356 As a
preliminary matter, the existence of a few cases that might pose
entanglement problems does not justify the ministerial exemption for all
ministerial employee suits. In any event, the fear that a court will
independently evaluate the spiritual qualities, or "gifts and graces," of a
minister and substitute its judgment for that of a religious institution relies
on two flawed assumptions. First, it assumes mistakenly that secular courts
must directly assess a plaintiffs qualifications in order to resolve a Title
VII case. Most Title VII cases, however, involve more than competing
claims about a plaintiffs abilities. Second, it assumes mistakenly that
courts will second-guess employers regarding subjective qualifications. But

351. 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
352. Id. at 623.
353. Id. at 621-22, 625. The Sixth Circuit also held that it would violate the free exercise
clause. Id.
354. Id. at 625.
355. Id. at 628.
356. Unlike objective reasons (e.g., employee fired due to adultery), which can be
measured and discredited directly (e.g., plaintiff did not commit adultery or men equally
guilty were not terminated), subjective reasons (e.g., insufficient spirituality) cannot. As will
be seen, they can, however, be rendered suspect by pointing to other reasons (e.g., timing
suggests retaliation).
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there is little evidence to support this fear. Courts in secular Title VII cases
already defer to employers on judgment calls outside their expertise, 357 and
courts are likely to be equally, if not more, deferential in cases against
religious employers.
The second assumption is belied by courts' treatment of suits brought by
professionals whose qualifications, such as academic scholarship for a
professorship or analytic ability for a law firm partnership, are not easily
measured. In these cases, courts do not presume to know what qualities are
necessary for professor or partner, nor do they second-guess subjective
judgments about whether a plaintiff possesses these qualities. Instead, they
defer to the employer's judgments on subjective professional
358
qualifications.
Courts readily acknowledge their greater deference in discrimination
cases involving subjective professional qualifications. In tenure cases, for
example, "[t]he federal courts have adhered consistently to the principle
that they operate with reticence and restraint. ' 359 Courts have declined to
sit as "Super-Tenure Review Committees," 360 and regularly echo the Third
Circuit's concern that courts vigilantly guard against "substitut[ing] their
judgment for that of the college with respect to the qualifications" because
such determinations are subjective and "involve inquiry into aspects of
arcane scholarship beyond the competence of individual judges." 36 1 Courts
357. See infra notes 357-367 and accompanying text.
358. See, e.g., Tracy Anbinder Baron, Keeping Women Out of the Executive Suite: The
Courts'Failureto Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 267, 268
(1994) ("When the position at stake is a prestigious white-collar job, courts tend to defer to
the employer, expressing fears of second-guessing the employer or infringing on the
employer's professional judgment."); Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in
High Places, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 962, 973-74 (1982) (stating that upper level employment
decisions usually rest on subjective evaluations, and "[i]n upper level cases.., courts often
profess their lack of expertise and refuse to assess candidates' qualifications"); Mark
Bartholomew, Judicial Deference and Sexual Discrimination in the University, 8 Buff.
Women's L.J. 56, 57 (1999-2000) ("Tenure discrimination plaintiffs confront a judiciary that
regularly defers to the administrative judgments of universities."); John D. Copeland & John
W. Murry, Jr., Getting Tossed from the Ivory Tower: The Legal Implications of Evaluating
Faculty Performance,61 Mo. L. Rev. 233, 246 (1996) ("For the most part, the courts have
viewed the evaluation of academic performance as an exercise outside the expertise of the
courts and one better left to academicians.").
359. Jiminez v. Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 377 (4th Cir. 1995).
360. Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 47 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
361. Kunda v. Muhlenberg Coll., 621 F.2d 532, 548 (3d Cir. 1980). This quote has been
cited in, for example, Bickerstaffv. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 455 n.7 (2d Cir. 1999),
and Jiminez, 57 F.3d at 377. See also Bina v. Providence Coll., 39 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir.
1994) ("[R]eview of tenure decisions should be guided by an appropriately deferential
standard. A court may not simply substitute its own views concerning the plaintiffs
qualifications for those of the properly instituted authorities."); Fields v. Clark Univ., 966
F.2d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 1992) (emphasizing the "high degree of deference due to" the
University's tenure decision); Brousard-Norcross v. Augustana Coll. Ass'n, 935 F.2d 974,
975-76 (8th Cir. 1991) ("Our review of a tenure decision is approached with trepidation ....
We do not profess to possess the expertise required to evaluate such decisions for their
merit.").
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have also declined to review law firms' partnership decisions on the
grounds that they lack competence to evaluate associates' analytical
that a judge, if anyone, would be
abilities 362-even though one might think
363
capable of making such an evaluation.
There is no reason to believe that courts would be less deferential to
religious organizations regarding subjective qualifications like spirituality.
If anything, judges are likely to be more deferential since, generally
speaking, they do not have any nonjudicial experience in this area. While
judges' extreme deference is questionable in contexts such as disputes
about legal ability, 364 it is particularly apt in the case of a ministerial claim
given the establishment clause strictures against resolving religious
disputes.
In sum, given conflicting accounts of a candidate's spirituality, a court
will not second-guess a religious organization's evaluation or contest that
spirituality was a necessary quality. Thus, while evidence that the plaintiff
is more qualified than a successful candidate, without more, may suffice to
establish a discriminatory motive in theory, 365 in practice, it will not, and
courts will grant summary judgment to the defendant.36 6 The plaintiff
needs additional circumstantial evidence. 367 So the fear that courts will
independently review and substitute their judgment of a candidate's gifts
and graces has no basis in the reality of Title VII case law.
In any event, the belief that all cases boil down to an "employee-said
versus employer-said" competition regarding subjective qualifications is
another mistaken assumption. As the list of circumstantial evidence
demonstrates, 368 offering evidence of a plaintiffs superior qualifications is
362. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1993). The law
firm claimed that it rejected plaintiff's partnership bid because of a "subtle and subjective
consensus among the partners, that she did not possess sufficient legal analytic ability to
handle complex litigation." Id. at 526. Unlike the district court, the appeals court deferred to
the law firm's assertion that outstanding courtroom ability and client relations could not
compensate for less than superior analytic ability. Id. at 528. And, with no objective criteria
to measure legal analytic ability, the appeals court deferred to the law firm's evaluation. Id.
at 530.
363. After all, judges are often former law firm partners and also analyze analytic ability
when they hire law clerks.
364. See generally Baron, supra note 358; Bartholet, supra note 358; Bartholomew, supra
note 358; Scott A. Moss, Against "Academic Deference": How Recent Developments in
Employment Discrimination Law Undercut an Already Dubious Doctrine, 27 Berkeley J.
Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 3-4 (2006).
365. "Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some
circumstances, to show pretext." Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1195, 1197 (2006).
366. The one exception is if the qualification lends itself to objective measure and the
disparity is obvious. While the Supreme Court recently ruled that the disparity need not be
"so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face," and declined to
articulate the proper standard, the Supreme Court also cited, seemingly with approval, other
standards currently in use, including proof that the "plaintiffs qualifications are clearly
superior to those of the selected job applicant" or that the "plaintiff was significantly better
qualified." Id. at 1197-98 (internal quotation marks omitted).
367. See supra notes 315-320 and accompanying text.
368. See id.
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only one method of proving discriminatory motive without direct evidence.
Plaintiffs can offer a range of evidence unrelated to subjective
qualifications. Courts can evaluate whether this other evidence-besides
evaluation of scholarship or analytic ability or spirituality-gives rise to the
suspicion that the proffered reason was either pretextual or not the sole
reason behind the adverse employment decision. So, while courts will not
independently evaluate subjective qualifications, they can without risking
entanglement judge the plausibility of a defendant's evaluation based upon
all circumstantial evidence.369
. The lack of entanglement can be illustrated with an actual Title VII
retaliation claim that the plaintiff was not allowed to pursue because of the
ministerial exemption. In Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal
Church, Inc.,370 the plaintiff was an ordained minister of the Christian
Methodist Church. 371 One of his coworkers, Veronica Little, another
minister, confided in him that her immediate supervisor had made sexual
advances towards her, and asked for guidance. 3 72 Lee Otis Gellington
helped her prepare an official complaint to the church elders. 373 After she
was fired, he helped her take legal action. 374 A church bishop, Bishop
Bass, asked Gellington to persuade Little to drop her complaint. Gellington
refused. 375 Shortly thereafter, Bishop Bass reassigned Gellington to a
church 800 miles away from his home and at half his salary. 3 76 Gellington
377
was not able to comply with this assignment and was forced to resign.
Because the court applied the ministerial exemption, the church never had
to articulate a legitimate reason for the transfer, for example that
Gellington's spiritual temperament and abilities were a better match to the
new church. If the same fact pattern had occurred in a secular context, most
courts would find a strong circumstantial case of retaliation. Thus, even if
Gellington's employer had claimed that he was better suited for his new

369. This task is even easier in direct evidence cases. Take a church that hires a male
applicant rather than a highly competitive female one because, it claims, she was not a
spiritual match. Plaintiff presents evidence that the decision-maker said, "I don't care if
plaintiff is better qualified, I don't want to have to look for a replacement again in three
years when she has children." This comment undermines the defendant's credibility and
makes clear that discrimination based on pregnancy motivated the decision. Attaching
liability in this circumstance does not implicate spiritual or doctrinal concerns. Indeed, Kent
Greenawalt, who otherwise supports the ministerial exemption, has suggested that Title VII
suits meeting some high threshold of proof, such as direct evidence of intentional
discrimination, ought to be allowed. Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free
Exercise and Fairness 386 (2006).
370. 203 F.3d 1299 (11 th Cir. 2000).
371. Id. at 1301.
372. Id.
373. Id.

374. Id.
375. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Gellington, 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 1999) (No. CV-97-P2719-W), 1999 WL 33619168.
376. Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1301; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 375, at 5-6.
377. Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1301.
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assignment, the case could be decided solely upon the circumstances
surrounding his reassignment.
One might nonetheless argue that merely determining whether the
defendant's stated reason is pretextual entangles the court in a religious
dispute. 378 This reasoning misses the mark. First, the court's decision as to
whether the employer's proffered justification is plausible is well within its
competence. While a law firm or university or church may have expertise
in knowing who is best suited for a job, courts have expertise in evaluating
circumstantial evidence to ferret out discrimination. Second, apart from
comparing evidence of qualifications, the techniques courts use to assess
credibility are the same whether the proffered legitimate, reason is
nonreligious, religious and measurable, or religious and subjective. Indeed,
3 79
examining circumstantial evidence surrounding an employment decision
can be considered applying a neutral principle of secular law, and resolution
of religious disputes by neutral methods was specifically approved in Jones
v. Wo/f,3 80 the most recent church property case. 38 1 Since an employee's
claims may be resolved by relying on neutral methods of proof, religious
organizations should not be shielded from having their reasons scrutinized
just because they proffer a subjective religious reason. Finally, if the
circumstantial evidence is lacking, the courts will defer to the defendant's
evaluation.
3. The Risk that Title VII Remedies Will Lead to Entanglement
The second substantive entanglement argument focuses on remedies.
Title VII allows a range of remedies, including reinstatement. 382 Perhaps
what distinguishes cases brought by ministers as opposed to non-ministers
is not so much the analysis of the substantive claim, but the remedy. It is
one thing to force a religious organization to hire, promote, or retain
someone without religious duties, it is quite another to foist onto that
organization ministers it has deemed spiritually wanting. Especially
troubling is the prospect that the court could make a mistake.
The first question to ask is in what way does forcing a religious
organization to hire or promote a minister, teacher, or music director against
378. Lupu & Tuttle, Distinctive Place, supra note 164, at 91 (arguing that the ministerial
exemption is justified because "[tihe dangers of entanglement seem to us particularly acute
when the state's agents are attempting to discern the 'true' reason why religious officials
have taken a particular action, with the attendant risk of mistake concerning the officials'
motivations").
379. Circumstantial evidence may include documentary and testimonial evidence about
credibility, stereotyping, disparate treatment, procedural deviations, and timing, among other
things. See supra notes 317-23, 329 and accompanying text.
380. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
381. In some respects, there was more risk of entanglement in Jones because the neutral
principles of secular law (e.g., well-established trust and property common law principles)
were being used to interpret religious documents. Cf id. at 602. In contrast, a Title VII case
does not necessarily require the court to examine any religious documents at all.
382. See infra note 394.

2007]

THE MINISTERIAL EXEMPTION

2023

its will violate the establishment clause? According to proponents of the
ministerial exemption, the answer is obvious: The state ought not interfere
3 83
with the church's selection and placement of its own representatives.
The church, not the state, should decide who will best embody and
disseminate its teachings. 3 84 Installing a church's minister is only one step
away from declaring what the church's beliefs are.
But what if a candidate was rejected because of discrimination and not
because of any spiritual failings? What if in Gellington a remorseful
Bishop Bass confessed that he transferred Gellington in anger, and that
Gellington's gifts and graces had nothing to do with his reassignment?
What harm is done by returning Gellington to his former congregation?
The church had at one time believed that he was suited to this position and
has now admitted that he was not transferred because of any failings
relevant to the position. Consequently, Gellington will not misrepresent the
church or warp the development of religious doctrine.
Indeed, if
discrimination distorted the decision-making process, reinstatement might
actually benefit the church. Reinstatement in this situation restores to the
church someone who would have been chosen but for discrimination and
aligns church practices with beliefs. In other words, for churches that do
not claim that their tenets require discrimination, a decision influenced by
discrimination is a mistake (or worse) from the church's point of view, and
the state is merely requiring the church to fix it.38 5 Granted, reinstatement
by the state might offend the idea that churches should be completely
autonomous in internal affairs, but, as argued above, the religion clauses do
not guarantee church autonomy in internal affairs; instead, they merely
forbid the state from discriminating against religion (free exercise clause) or
becoming entangled with religion by resolving doctrinal disputes or
otherwise engaging in spiritual evaluations (establishment clause).
A more difficult case arises when there is a reasonable possibility that the
court might be wrong. After all, most cases rely on circumstantial evidence
and the employee, like any other civil plaintiff, need only prove her case on
a balance of probabilities. Direct evidence of discrimination is rare,
383. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
384. See id.

385. An analogy can be drawn to tenure cases. In Brown v. Trustees of Boston
University, 891 F.2d 337, 360 (1st Cir. 1989), for example, the university argued that
awarding tenure to rejected candidates infringed its First Amendment right to academic
freedom because it does not allow the university to determine for itself who may best teach.
The First Circuit rejected this argument, stating,
Academic freedom does not include the freedom to discriminate against tenure
candidates on the basis of sex or other impermissible grounds.... While we have
been and remain hesitant to interfere with universities' independent judgment in
choosing their faculty, we have said that we will respect universities' judgment
only "so long as they do not discriminate."
Id. (quoting Kumar v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Mass., 774 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1985) (Campbell,
C.J., concurring)). Similarly, a religious institution's freedom to choose its spiritual leaders
does not include the freedom to illegally discriminate against ministerial employees on
grounds unrelated to spirituality.
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especially since discriminatory decisions are so often the result of
unconscious processes rather than conscious animosity.3 86 What if in
relying on circumstantial evidence, the factfinder concludes that
discrimination played a role when it did not? Or, what if the factfinder
correctly finds that an employment decision -was motivated by legitimate
and illegitimate reasons, but erroneously rejects the defendant's claim that it
would have made the same decision regardless? Specifically, what if
Bishop Bass felt some anger towards Gellington, but would have
transferred him anyway because Gellington really was better suited for the
lower-paid congregation? Cases like Gellington, where the proffered
reason is subjective, seem particularly vulnerable to error: Since there is no
way to measure it, one can never be quite certain of its role.
First, reinstatement is not automatically available any time a plaintiff
proves that discrimination motivated an adverse employment action. While
a defendant is automatically liable, it can limit the remedies if it establishes
that it would have made the same decision even without the
discrimination. 387 Thus if Gellington's employer proves it would have
reassigned Gellington even without the retaliation, the court could not
reinstate him.
Second, to the extent that any mistakes will be made, they will likely be
in the other direction. That is, in Title VII cases brought by ministerial
employees, factfinders are much more likely to miss discrimination than to
find discrimination where there is none. To start, the plaintiff always bears
the burden of proving that discrimination motivated a decision. 388 In
addition, courts' great deference regarding subjective qualifications 389
carries over into the evaluation of other circumstantial evidence. In other
words, in cases where the defendant's asserted reason implicates a
professional subjective qualification, courts seem to demand stronger
evidence than they might otherwise require. The First Circuit has explicitly
stated that the deferential standard in tenure decisions means that the
circumstantial evidence "'must be of such strength and quality as to permit
a reasonable finding that the denial of tenure was "obviously" or
"manifestly" unsupported.' ' 390 The Third Circuit has explained that
"cautions against 'unwarranted invasion or intrusion' into matters involving
professional judgments about an employee's qualification... inform the
386. See generally Linda Hamilton Kreiger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discriminationand EqualEmployment Opportunity,47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161
(1995); Lawrence, supra note 219.
387. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 359-367 and accompanying text.
390. Bina v. Providence Coll., 39 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Brown, 891 F.2d at
346); Villanueva v. Wellesley Coll., 930 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Jimenez v. Mary
Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 1995); Sidique v. Univ. of Pittsburg Dep't of
Dermatology, No. 02-365, 2003 WL 22290334 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2003) (recognizing the
"Third Circuit Court's longstanding recognition that decisions made by university
faculties.., are entitled to heightened deference").
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is
remainder of [the court's] analysis."'39 1 In short, a ministerial plaintiff
392
discrimination.
of
evidence
unmistakable
without
prevail
to
unlikely
393
Finally, courts can always limit plaintiffs recovery to monetary relief.
Under Title VII, a prevailing party may obtain backpay, reinstatement, or
other equitable relief.394 Awards, however, are entrusted to the trial court's
discretion. Reinstatement is the preferred remedy, as it best realizes the
make-whole goal of Title VII. 395 But when reinstatement is not possible or
391. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 527 (3d Cir. 1993).
Similarly, in Weinstock v. Columbia University, 224 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), the Second
Circuit found that the University Provost's denial of tenure to a Barnard assistant chemistry
professor because "her scholarship was not up to snuff," see id. at 39, was not discriminatory
despite evidence of the following:
*
Weinstock received tenure support from the Barnard Chemistry Department, the
Barnard Committee of Appointments, Tenure, and Promotions, the Barnard President,
and the Columbia Chemistry Department. Id. at 38.
" The ad hoc tenure committee voted 3-2 in favor of tenure. Id. at 39.
*
The Provost attended ad hoc committee meetings, where members who had never met
Weinstock referred to her by her first name and observed that Weinstock seemed nice
and nurturing. As the dissent noted, "[A] stereotypically 'feminine' person is not
viewed in a male dominated field as a driven, scientifically-minded, competitive
academic researcher." Id. at 38-39, 57.
*
The tenure process was marred by procedural irregularities. Id. at 40.
" The Provost wrote a letter erroneously stating that the ad hoc committee voted against
tenure 3-2 and incorrectly charging that one professor had criticized rather than
complimented Weinstock's work. Id. at 43.
" The Provost had published a book titled "Fair Science: Women in the Scientific
Community" in 1979, arguing that women scientists were not subject to sex
discrimination in matters of promotion. Id. at 55.
*
Women were underrepresented in the faculty. For example, only fifteen percent of
natural science professors at Columbia were women, a number that had not changed
during the provost's twelve-year tenure. Id. at 52.
The deferential Second Circuit concluded that "the record at best indicates a difference of
opinion in evaluation of scholarly merit, and not gender discrimination." Id. at 46 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
392. Again, while this demanding level of proof is problematic for secular cases, cf supra
notes 307-327 and accompanying text, it does protect against establishment clause violations
for religious cases.
393. Rutherford, supra note 29, at 1125-26 (suggesting the remedy in hiring suits should
be limited to monetary damages).
394. Title VII authorizes a court to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay ...or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)(l) (2000). With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a plaintiff also
may recover compensatory damages "for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses," id.
§ 1981a(b)(3), and punitive damages if the defendant acted "with malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." Id. § 1981 a(b)(1).
395. As the Supreme Court has explained, the goals of Title VII include "eradicating
discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered
through past discrimination." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). To
make a plaintiff whole, the court should place her in the position she would have occupied
but for the discrimination. As the Third Circuit has recognized, monetary damages are often
inadequate: "'When a person loses his job, it is at best disingenuous to say that money
damages can suffice to make that person whole. The psychological benefits of work are
intangible, yet they are real and cannot be ignored....' Thus... reinstatement is the
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practicable, 396 courts have opted to provide frontpay in lieu of
reinstatement. 397 There is also precedent for courts limiting relief to
frontpay based on the strength of the evidence. 398 Courts' deference to
professional employers also reappears at the remedy stage, with courts
reluctant to award to victorious Title VII plaintiffs tenure or firm
partnership or other promotions dependent on subjective evaluations. 399 In
a similar fashion, courts could easily choose frontpay over reinstatement for
cases giving them pause. Given the strong preference for reinstatement, I
would not recommend frontpay as the default remedy when ministerial
employees win Title VII suits. However, its availability as an option for
close cases helps ensure that courts reinstate only those ministers, teachers,
music directors, and other ministerial employees that they are confident the
religious organization itself would have selected in a discrimination-free
decision-making process.
C. EntanglementProblems of Applying the MinisterialExemption
To close, I observe that application of the ministerial exemption can
entangle a court in religious doctrine more than application of Title VII. In
determining whether a plaintiff counts as a "minister" who triggers the
ministerial exemption, courts must decide whether the plaintiff plays an
important religious role. 40 0 In so doing, courts are deciding directly
questions of religious doctrine in a way they never do when deciding
whether discrimination occurred.
For the ministerial exemption to apply, the plaintiff in a discrimination
suit must be a "ministerial" employee. If courts limited the application of
the exemption to ordained clergy, it would be easy to apply and raise no
entanglement concerns. Courts do not, however, simply defer to a religious
entity's characterization of a position, as it could simply characterize all its

preferred remedy in the absence of special circumstances militating against it." Squires v.
Bonser, 54 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (quoting Allen v. Autauga County
Bd. of Educ., 685 F.2d 1302, 1306 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
396. For example, reinstatement may not be viable "because of continuing hostility
between the plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or because of psychological injuries
suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the discrimination." Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001). In such cases, "[c]ourts recognize[] ... that an award of
front pay as a substitute for reinstatement ...was a necessary part of the 'make whole' relief
mandated by Congress and by this Court in Albemarle." Id. at 850.
397. See, e.g., id. at 846-47.
398. Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 43 n.1 (1st Cir. 2003) ("In the past,
we have indicated a number of special considerations that influence the district court
determination [to deny reinstatement] in specific cases, including.., the strength of the
evidence .... (citation omitted)).
399. For example, only a handful of academic plaintiffs have prevailed with a judicial
award of tenure. See Kathyrn R. Swedlow, Suing for Tenure: Legal and Institutional
Barriers,13 Rev. Litig. 557, 595 (1994); see also Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1333
(6th Cir. 1988) (stating that tenure is awarded in "only the most exceptional cases").
400. See infra notes 401-412 and accompanying text.
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employees as ministers. 40 1 Thus, courts have taken a functional approach
to determining who counts as a minister; if an employee's "primary duties
consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a
religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and
worship, he or she should be considered clergy." 40 2 Not every job with
religious overtones is a ministerial position; otherwise, everyone working
for an organization with a spiritual mission would be exempt. For example,
parochial schools often list their mission as "instill[ing] in our children the
Gospel message of Jesus Christ"40 3 and expect their teachers to model for
students the school's religious values. 40 4 Yet, a math teacher is probably
not a minister. A theology teacher probably is. But what about a school
choir director or school principal? 40 5 In order to decide whether this
position is ministerial, the court must determine whether a plaintiff's job "is
important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church. 4 06
In order to decide "whether a position is important to the spiritual and
pastoral mission of the church," 40 7 a court must delve into the religious
beliefs and doctrine of a particular religion. 40 8 In ruling that a church's
musical director was a minister, for example, the Fourth Circuit analyzed
the religious significance of music. The plaintiff argued that she was
merely "a lay choir director and teacher, charged with the responsibility of

401. See, e.g., Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990)

(describing a religious school's statement that all "teachers consider teaching to be their
personal ministry"); EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir.

1981) (explaining that the Seminary urges that all its employees, including support staff,
serve a ministerial function).
402. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th
Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
403. Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 656 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
404. See, e.g., id. at 656 n.1 (stating that teachers are "expected to uphold, by word and
example, all truths, values, and teachings of the Roman Catholic church" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
405. As the Ninth Circuit observed,
[W]e routinely have to ask what function is served by alter servers, choirboys, lay
ministers, lay deacons, ushers, acolytes and cruficers.
Rabbis are clearly
ministerial, but what about the gabbai, the shames, the cook in the synagogue's
kitchen (who may have unorthodox views about whether swordfish is kosher)?...
Religions vary drastically in their hierarchical and organizational structure, and it
is often a tricky business to distinguish spiritual from administrative officials and
clergy from congregation.
Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 2005).

406. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.
407. Id.
408. Cf Scott D. McClure, Religious Preferences in Employment Decisions: How Far

May Religious Organizations Go?, 1990 Duke L.J. 587, 595. In explaining why the § 702
exception to Title VII (allowing religious organizations to discriminate based on religion)
should apply to religious and nonreligious positions, McClure argues that the court's
reservation of the "final say as to what is religious and what is secular entangles the
government in religion." Id.
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training people to sing and perform music. ' 409 The court disagreed,
holding that
[music] serves a unique function in worship by virtue of its capacity to
uplift the spirit and manifest the relationship between the individual or
congregation and the Almighty....
...We cannot say .. .that the reading of scripture or the reciting of
prayers is any more integral to religious worship than the singing of
hymns or the intonation
of chants. Whether spoken or sung, psalms lift
4 10
eyes unto the hills.
The court therefore concluded that the music director's job was "an
integral part of Catholic worship and belief."4 1'
In reaching this
conclusion, the court did exactly what the establishment clause forbids:
choose between competing religious visions. In the plaintiffs vision of the
Roman Catholic faith, music's significance did not rise to the level of
ministry, such that teaching it made her a minister. In the defendant's
vision, it did. The court essentially resolved a religious dispute about the
role of music. As one circuit judge has observed, "The very invocation of
the ministerial exemption requires us to engage in entanglement with a
4 12
vengeance."
In contrast, application of Title VII never requires that kind of direct
grappling with religious doctrine or beliefs. In a Title VII case, the court
does not decide what is important to a religion. Instead, it decides whether
a legitimate religious reason or an illegitimate secular reason
(discrimination) motivated a decision. 4 13 In other words, the court judges
the credibility of a religious reason, rather than whether something is
religiously true. 4 14 And it makes that decision not by judging competing
religious visions, but by judging circumstantial evidence, exactly the same
kind of evidence it would evaluate in a nonreligious case. In sum,
evaluating the credibility of proffered religious reasons based on
circumstantial evidence is within the court's role, and within its expertise.
Resolving religious questions-even if correctly-is not.
IV. LIMITATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF ExPRESSIvE ASSOCIATION
JUSTIFICATION

While the focus of this Article is on the continued vitality of the
ministerial exemption under the Constitution's religion clauses, Part IV

409. EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 802 (4th Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 2005).
413. Cf supra Part III.B.1.
414. Courts avoid any questions about religious truth, i.e., that a position requires
spirituality or adherence to religious tenets, by deferring to the religious organization.
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briefly analyzes an alternate constitutional justification for the ministerial
exemption: the First Amendment freedom of expressive association. 4 15
Proponents of the ministerial exemption claim that religious
organizations must have autonomy in order to ensure that they are able to
freely "designate leaders and spokespersons for the faith. '4 16 This freedom
may be supported by the First Amendment right of expressive association,
which protects the right of all associations-religious and nonreligious-to
choose leaders who will properly represent and convey an association's
messages. 4 17 Following the Supreme Court decision in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale,4 18 which strengthened this right considerably, several
commentators have either approved or conceded reluctantly the sway of this
justification. 4 19 While I do not necessarily disagree, I believe it important
to note that two important consequences flow from grounding the
ministerial exemption in the right to expressive association. First, this right
will not exempt all religious organizations from Title VII, only those that
espouse discrimination. Second, even for them, coverage is not automatic
but potentially subject to a compelling state interest in eliminating sex and
race discrimination in paid employment.
A. The Right of Expressive Association
Implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment is a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of
415. The Constitution also recognizes a constitutional right of intimate association. See
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). This right is grounded in the
substantive due process prong of the Fourteenth Amendment and guarantees "highly
personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the
State." Id. at 618. This privacy right applies to close emotional affiliations like family
relationships. Id. at 619-20. Employment associations likely fall outside its purview: "[T]he
Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's power to control the selection of
one's spouse that would not apply to regulations affecting the choice of one's fellow
employees." Id. at 620. To the extent the right to intimate association covered employment
in any context, the employment relationship must, at the very least, be "distinguished by
such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and
maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship." Id.
A family-run business with a few employees or an extremely small and close-knit religious
organization might qualify. But an association small enough to have such intimate
relationships is not likely to be covered by Title VII in the first place, as Title VII does not
apply to organizations with fewer than fifteen employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
416. Lupu & Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct, supra note 26, at 1809; see id. (stating that
religious leaders "regulate [a religious community's] worship life, preside over changes in its
liturgy and sense of values, and communicate its stories, beliefs, ethics, and sense of
continuity from one generation to the next"); see also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
417. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
418. Id. at 640.
419. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text; see also Lupu & Tuttle, Distinctive
Place, supra note 164, at 72-74; Gila Stopler, The Free Exercise of Discrimination:
Religious Liberty, Civic Community and Women's Equality, 10 Win. & Mary J. Women &
L. 459, 476 (2004) ("[I]t seems safe to say that in light of its recent decision in Boy Scouts,
the Supreme Court will embrace the position that religious institutions should be exempt
from anti-discrimination laws.").
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the same activities. 4 20
Expressive associations further free speech's
marketplace of ideas because "by collective efforts individuals can make
their views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or
lost. '42 1 According to the Supreme Court, for the marketplace of ideas to
flourish, all speech must be protected, including unpopular expression:
"[T]he fact that an idea may be embraced and advocated by increasing
numbers of people is all the more reason to protect the First Amendment
'422
rights of those who wish to voice a different view.
The state can burden an association's expression by outright suppression
as it might with individual speech. The state can also intrude by interfering
with the association's membership or leadership decisions. As Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor explained, "[T]he formation of an expressive
association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the
definition of that voice. '42 3
Accordingly, despite a state public
accommodation law barring discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, the Boy Scouts were allowed to reject a gay man as a Scout
leader because it claimed his presence would significantly affect the group's
424
ability to advocate antihomosexual views.
425
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
signaled heightened protection for
expressive associations. In a significant departure from prior precedent, the
Supreme Court exhibited great deference to the defendant association's
claims about its expression. The Court accepted that homosexuality was
inconsistent with values the Boy Scouts sought to instill, despite the lack of
any clear policy on the matter. 426 The Court also accepted the Boy Scouts'
claim that allowing Dale to serve as an assistant scoutmaster would
significantly interfere with its message, even if Dale never discussed his
sexuality: "As we give deference to an association's assertions regarding
the nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an association's

420. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
421. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981); see also
William P. Marshall, Discriminationand the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 68, 77
(1986) [hereinafter Marshall, Association] ("Limiting the right of expression to the cries of a

lone speaker hardly would promote the interchange of ideas envisioned in the first
amendment.").
422. Dale, 530 U.S. at 660.
423. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 648

(stating that suppression may result from state intrusions into the internal structure or affairs
of an association by, for example, foisting an unwanted member upon the association).
424. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648; see also Hurley v. Iish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group

of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 580 (1995) (holding that compelling organizers of a private St.
Patrick's Day parade to include Irish-American gay, lesbian, and bisexual groups would
violate the parade organizers' First Amendment rights).
425. 530 U.S. 640.
426. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 651 ("The Boy Scouts assert that.., it does not want to
promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior .... We need not inquire
further to determine the nature of the Boy Scouts' expression with respect to
homosexuality." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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view of what would impair its expression. '427 Dale does, however, make
clear that an association seeking protection must actually have a message
42 8
that would in some way be impaired.
B. Religions Without DiscriminatoryMessages
Dale's protection matches the ministerial exemption for religious
institutions whose religious doctrines require race or sex discrimination.
Churches that limit ordination to men, for example, can argue that
antidiscrimination law interferes with their message about the proper roles
of men and women. Given Dale's insistence on deference to organizations
regarding the content and possible impairment of their message, there is
42 9
little risk of excessive entanglement with doctrine.
On the other hand, Dale cannot shield from Title VII organizations
without discriminatory beliefs. As a free speech right, the right is
implicated only if expression is at risk.4 30 Religious organizations whose
beliefs are consistent with the goals of Title VII, or even silent on the issue
of discrimination,4 3 1 cannot complain that compliance interferes with their
expression. 432 Deference to an asserted message requires a message: Even
the Dale Court is unlikely to allow the Boy Scouts to expel a gay
scoutmaster if it asserted no message against homosexuality. 433 Likewise,
427. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. In contrast, the Supreme Court had previously rejected
claims that inclusion of blacks or women would undermine an association's expressive
message. See infra note 441. The dissent criticized the Dale Court's deference as "an
astounding view of the law. I am unaware of any previous instance in which our analysis of
the scope of a constitutional right was determined by looking at what a litigant asserts in his
or her brief and inquiring no further." Dale, 530 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
428. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (majority opinion) ("[T]o come within [the freedom of
expressive association] ambit, a group must engage is some sort of expression."); see also id.
at 655 (stating that an "association must . . . engage in expressive activity that could be
impaired in order to be entitled to protection").
429. An exemption based on associational rights would lead to less entanglement than the
current ministerial exemption because it would depend upon the religious organization's
declaring that it had a discriminatory message, not on the court's deciding who is a
ministerial employee. And while the Court's deference to the Boy Scouts has met with
significant criticism, deference to religious organizations about their doctrine would be
appropriate in light of lingering establishment clause concerns.
430. See supra note 422 and accompanying text.
431. Some question the constitutionality of compelling expressive associations that have
not taken a position on discrimination to articulate their beliefs, suggesting that an
association should not have to state that it believes in discrimination in order to practice it.
See Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A
TripartiteApproach, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1515, 1542, 1555-57 (2001). But Carpenter cannot
mean that associations need never assert their discriminatory message. After all, even the
Boy Scouts announced their antihomosexuality stance. If Carpenter were correct, any entity
could invoke freedom of expressive association against a Title VII claim without ever
committing to a (probably socially unpopular) stance, a result not countenanced by Dale,
which recognized that an association must at least have a message burdened by state action.
432. See Lupu & Tuttle, Distinctive Place, supra note 164, at 73-74 (noting that
supporters of the neutrality paradigm do not think the ministerial exemption is justified for
religions without discriminatory policies).
433. See supra notes 418-25 and accompanying text.
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churches cannot claim an expressive association right of exemption from
Title VII unless they profess a belief in sex or race discrimination.
C. Religions with DiscriminatoryMessages
While Dale seems to apply to those religious organizations that have
discriminatory beliefs, these organizations will not necessarily receive a
free pass to discriminate. As acknowledged in Dale, the freedom of
association is not absolute. 434 A law may burden the right to freedom of
association if the law furthers a compelling state interest that cannot be
achieved by significantly less restrictive means.4 35 The Boy Scouts
succeeded because the Supreme Court held that New Jersey's interest in
preventing discrimination against gays and lesbians was not compelling
enough to outweigh the Boy Scouts' interest in shaping and delivering their
4 36
antihomosexuality message.
The ministerial exemption from Title VII differs in at least two
significant respects. First, it implicates race and sex discrimination as
opposed to sexual orientation discrimination. At the time Dale was
decided, the Court had recognized only limited constitutional protection for
homosexuality: 437 Sexual orientation was not a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification for equal protection purposes, 4 38 and the elimination of
discrimination against gays and lesbians was not a compelling state interest.
On the contrary, it was still constitutional to criminalize homosexual sexual
439
activity.
In contrast, race and sex classifications are suspect under the equal
protection clause,4 40 and eradication of race and sex discrimination has long
been recognized as a compelling state interest. 44 1 Because Title VII
434. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) ("But the freedom of
expressive association, like many freedoms, is not absolute."); see also Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
435. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
436. Id. at 659.
437. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that an amendment to
the Colorado Constitution prohibiting any legal action to protect homosexuals from
discrimination failed rational review and violated equal protection).
438. Id. (applying rational basis review); see also Carpenter, supra note 431, at 1526 n.45
(describing the equal protection clause as impotent in protecting gays and lesbians).
439. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (concluding that a statute criminalizing
sodomy did not violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (concluding that homosexuals have a constitutional right to
engage in private consensual sexual activity). Lawrence, which also condemned Bowers as
"demean[ing] the lives of homosexual persons," and noted that homosexual sexual activity
"can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring," suggests greater
protection in the future. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575, 567.
440. In the equal protection context, race classifications trigger strict scrutiny, Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), and sex classifications trigger intermediate
scrutiny, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
441. See, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193 (1990) ("Few would deny that
ferreting out.., invidious [sex and race] discrimination is a great, if not compelling,
governmental interest."); N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 n.5 (1988)
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advances the egalitarian goals of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII's
antidiscrimination objectives are "even stronger than most [state]
interests... assert[ed] as compelling. '44 2 In fact, the Supreme Court has
found eradication of race and sex discrimination important enough to
override freedom of association challenges in the past. 443 While the
Supreme Court may countenance a Boy Scouts of America with no gay
scoutmasters, it is less clear that it would tolerate exclusion of black
4
scoutmasters. 44
Second, the ministerial exemption involves paid employment, not
voluntary membership. This commercial setting is significant, but not only
for the reasons generally acknowledged. Most commentators track Justice
O'Connor's conclusion that an organization's characterization as
commercial or expressive, determined by its primary goals/activities,
decides the weight of its interests. 445 If the association's main focus is
business, then its expression warrants less protection. 446 Therefore,
according to Justice O'Connor, a lawyer at a large for-profit commercial
firm is better shielded by antidiscrimination law44 7 than one at a
("[T]he Court has recognized the State's 'compelling interest' in combating invidious
discrimination"); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (stating that
the government's "fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in
education.., substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on
petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs").
442. Rutherford, supra note 29, at 1116.
443. See N.Y. State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 13 (sex); Bd. of Directors of Rotary Int'l v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (sex); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
623 (1984) (sex); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 (race); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 175-76 (1976) (race). Cf Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (sex). The
Court justified its ruling in these cases by finding the antidiscrimination interest compelling
and the burden on expression limited.
444. The exclusion of girls raises slightly different questions. Unlike the exclusion of
women from ministerial positions, exclusion of girls from Boy Scouts is arguably not
invidious, since they can join the roughly equivalent Girl Scouts, making the scout clubs
more akin to single-sex schools, which the Supreme Court has not condemned, see United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), as opposed to segregated schools, which the Court
obviously has.
445. According to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "An association must choose its market.
Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it loses the complete
control over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the
marketplace of ideas." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636; see, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice,
and Exit: The ConstitutionalBounds of the Right ofAssociation, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 821,
832-35 (2002) (finding that nonprofit status is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
expressive association protection); Carpenter, supra note 431, at 1564 ("[Tlhe distinction
between expressive associations (generally protected from the application of antidiscrimination law) and primarily commercial associations (not strongly protected) appears
to drive the results in this area."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families,and Schools, 85
Minn. L. Rev. 1917, 1924-25 (2001) (arguing that the Jaycees lost in Roberts because of
commercial context-the primary purpose of that organization was business networking).
446. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 431, at 1566-70 (detailing "relaxed protection" for
commercial activity and commercial speech).
447. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (rejecting the associational claims of a large commercial law
firm)).
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(presumably) nonprofit legal advocacy group. 448 If this were the only role
commerce played, then it would favor associational protection for religious
organizations, most of which are not commerce-oriented or profit-making
449
ventures.
But with the ministerial exemption, the significance of commerce really
lies on other side of the scale: the state's antidiscrimination interest. 4 50 The
state's antidiscrimination interests are affected by the commerce/noncommerce divide in two ways. To start, whether justified or not, regulation
of private actors is considered more acceptable when they act in the public
sphere than in the private sphere, 45 1 and paid employment belongs in the
4 52
public sphere in a way that membership in a private association does not.
In other words, whether an attorney works at a large commercial firm or a
small public interest nonprofit, as someone who is paid for her services, she

448. Justice O'Connor describes the latter as "[I]awyering to advance social goals." Id. at
636. Even though the Jaycees organization was not itself a for-profit business, its main
purpose was commercial: "Recruitment and selling are commercial activities, even when
conducted for training rather than for profit." Id. at 640.
449. More than one commentator has pointed out that the "for profit/nonprofit"
dichotomy only roughly maps onto "commercial/expressive," especially since organizations
can be both commercial and expressive. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 445, at 893-94;
Carpenter, supra note 431, at 1576 (suggesting a third category of quasi-expressive
associations); Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive
Associations and the First Amendment, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1483, 1500 (2001). Examples
include public interest law firms that wish to make money and further social goals and forprofit religious newspapers.
450. In other words, on one side of the scale is the private organization's associational
interests, and on the other side of the scale is the state's antidiscrimination interests. The
weighing of both interests are affected by a commerce/non-commerce divide. For private
organizations' interests, the divide is between commercial and nonprofit. For the state's
interests, the divide is between paid employment and unpaid volunteering.
451. See, e.g., Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View
from Century's End, 49 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1999) (arguing that the master legal paradigm
in the U.S. is liberalism, where "there is a public sphere and a private sphere, and that the
state may act legitimately within the public sphere but not within the private sphere"). See
generally Michael C. Dorf, The Good Society, Commerce, and the Rehnquist Court, 69
Fordham L. Rev. 2161 (2001) (critiquing the distinction between public economic activities
and private noneconomic activities made by recent Supreme Court cases); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 973, 976-79 (1991) (describing how
the dichotomy between the regulated public sphere and the unregulated private sphere
facilitates violence against women). Note that the Supreme Court described the ordinance at
issue in Roberts as reaching "public, quasi-commercial conduct." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625
(emphasis added).
452. Dale Carpenter touches on this when he states that "[e]ven non-profit associations
may be commercial" if, among other things, "they employ a vast array of persons."
Carpenter, supra note 431, at 1572. But Carpenter does not explain why the employer of "a
vast array of persons" is more commercial than the employer of over fifteen (the number
used to define an employer under Title VII). Id.

2007]

THE MINISTERIAL EXEMPTION

2035

is involved in commerce and is part of the public sphere.4 53 In contrast,
454
Dale involved unpaid volunteering.
Of course, even membership in a private association is never a purely
private matter. The Boy Scouts' policy does not just exclude individuals,
but like a country club's whites-only admission policy, conveys a message
4 56
of inferiority4 55 and perpetuates subordination of the stigmatized group.
However, it is exactly this expressive message that the First Amendment
presumably protects. 457 But the public repercussions of discriminatory
employment policies are worse in the employment (as opposed to
volunteer) context: They extend beyond harmful messages to economic
impact. After all, Title VII would not cover ministerial employees if their
employment were not an economic activity that substantially affected
interstate commerce. 458 Even the court that created the ministerial
453. See Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model,
85 Minn. L. Rev. 1591, 1628 (2001) ("The currently dominant view would be that the term
'public,' as applied to the private sector, connotes an expansive market, including services as
well as goods, and intangible as well as tangible benefits.").
454. See Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. 640. In fact, the Court complained that New
Jersey's public accommodation laws ought not to have reached the Boy Scout volunteers.
See id. at 108-29.
455. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 334, at 45 (arguing that exclusion is a marker of
inferiority and stigmatizes those excluded); Deborah L. Rhode, Association and
Assimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 106, 108 (1986) ("As a symbolic matter, exclusion of
women, like that of racial or religious minorities, carries a stigma that affects individuals'
social status and self-perception."); cf Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)
(asserting that exclusion of black schoolchildren from white schools "generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone").
456. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 455, at 122 ("[T]hese symbols of inferiority... often
...become self-perpetuating."); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination,"
Accommodation, the Politics of (Disability)Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 842 (2003)
("The most important harm of stigma is ...the way it reproduces exclusion and inequality
across a range of spheres of public, civic, and social life."); Charles R. Lawrence III,
Crossburning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First
Amendment, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 787, 795 (1992) ("[V]erbal and symbolic acts form integral
links in historically ingrained systems of social discrimination. They work to keep
traditionally victimized groups in socially isolated, stigmatized and disadvantaged positions
through the promotion of fear, intolerance, degradation and violence.").
457. Whether free speech goals justify these harms is a long-standing debate. Compare
Richard A. Epstein, The ConstitutionalPerils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts,
74 S.Cal. L. Rev. 119, 119-20 (2000) (arguing that the Dale majority reached the right
decision in a classic conflict between freedom of association and freedom from
discrimination), and Paulsen, supra note 445, at 1919 (asserting that Dale "should have been
a relatively easy" case), with Andrew Koppelman, Signs of the Times: Dale v. Boy Scouts of
America and the Changing Meaning of Nondiscrimination,23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1819, 1835
(2002) (stating that First Amendment values are important but that "it doesn't follow that
these values should always take priority over the effort to break up entrenched patterns of
discrimination"), and Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interests of
Associations, 9 Wm.& Mary Bill Rts. J. 595, 595 (2001) (arguing that Dale was wrongly
decided because antidiscrimination law was narrowly tailored and advanced a compelling
interest).
458. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under its Commerce Clause power.
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress may exercise this power only over economic
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exemption in McClure v. Salvation Army acknowledged that the Salvation
4 59
Army is an "employer" engaged in "an industry affecting commerce."
And remember that the ministerial exemption covers not just churches, but
nonprofit religious entities that are even less like private voluntary
4 60
associations such as hospitals, nursing homes, schools, and universities.
Whatever reluctance the Court may have with respect to state regulation of
a private club, such reluctance has not yet extended to regulation of
commerce.
More importantly, the state's commitment to eradicating private
discrimination has always been strongest when it concerns individuals'
access to housing, education, and employment-areas where equal access is
crucial to fulfilling the nation's avowed goal of equal opportunity. 46 1 After
all, "[ab]olishing state-created discrimination would be a hollow victory if
those formerly subject to that discrimination were not afforded access to
opportunities in the private sector." 462 Indeed, as has been noted, the
Supreme Court has never found that freedom of association trumps
employment opportunities. 4 63 In fact, the Supreme Court has rejected
expressive association defenses in part because they would compromise
economic advancement. 4 64 In these cases, the Court held that guaranteeing
women equal access to the acquisition of leadership skills and business
contacts overcame burdens on associational rights. 46 5 One could certainly
argue that if ensuring women access to job skills and connections is a
compelling state interest, how much more so is access to jobs
466
themselves.
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. See United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
459. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1972) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The McClure court noted that the Salvation Army annually grossed over
$7,000,000; managed property worth more than $62,000,000; and employed approximately
3000 people. Id.
460. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
461. See, e.g., Marshall, Association, supra note 421, at 68 (stating that a right-todiscriminate argument will fail in "employment, accomodations, or education-essentially
those areas which, though privately controlled, involve access to publicly available
opportunities").
462. Id. at 92.
463. See Lupu & Tuttle, Faith-BasedInitiative,supra note 186, at 53 ("[C]ourts have not
generally extended principles of freedom of association to the employment relation.").
464. See Bd. of Directory of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548
(1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984); cf. Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (rejecting an expressive association defense in the context of a
commercial law firm). The Supreme Court has also rejected associational challenges in the
context of education. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976).
465. Duarte,481 U.S. at 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626; see also Rhode, supra note 455,
at 121 (describing the importance of men's associations in professional success).
466. Indeed, the diversity of expression that is the raison d'Etre for constitutional
protection of expressive associations cannot be achieved without, and in fact presumes,
equality of opportunity. The marketplace of ideas can only succeed if it is open to everyone.
But access to the marketplace requires market power, which Title VII seeks to secure for all.
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This may be why in another clash between Title VII and the free speech
clause-the limits on speech created by outlawing hostile work
environments4 6 7 -the Supreme Court has indicated in dicta that in the
workplace, antidiscrimination would prevail. 468 In that case, the Court
or
invalidated an ordinance barring hate crimes motivated by race, religion, 469
regulation.
speech
viewpoint-based
unconstitutional
an
as
sex bias
Nonetheless, the Court stated that Title VII prohibitions against harassment
motivated by sex or race were not similarly unconstitutional. 4 70 Driving
this conclusion may be the compelling interest in equal opportunity. 47 1 "If
workplace harassment could not be prohibited, the promise of equal
employment opportunity could prove to be an empty promise for many: an
employer might be required to hire minorities or women, but its employees
could drive them away." 472 Again, if an individual's free speech rights can
be curtailed in paid employment, it follows that an association's free speech
can be curtailed in the context of paid employment.
One rejoinder to these points is that the case law involved secular
expressive associations, such as the Rotary Club. 4 73 The ministerial
exemption, however, is meant to protect religious expressive associations,
and the calculus is different for religious interests. Under this reasoning,
the free speech clause would provide more protection for religious speech
than any other kind of speech. But this would contravene the fundamental
free speech principle prohibiting differential treatment based on

467. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 481 (1991) (questioning the
constitutionality of Title VII's ban on hostile Work environment).
468. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
469. Id. at 391.
470. Id. at 389 (finding Title VII's ban on "sexually derogatory" words constitutional
"since words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against
conduct" and stating that "a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of
speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather
than speech"); see also Mary Becker, How Free Is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
815, 833 (1996) (describing how R.A. V. "stated that Title VII's ban on sexual harassment is
not a constitutional problem"); Mark Oring & S.D. Hampton, When Rights Collide: Hostile
Work Environment vs. First Amendment Free Speech, 31 UWLA L. Rev. 135, 147 (2000)
("As a practical matter, R.A. V. makes clear how the current Court will rule on a first
amendment challenge to hostile environment regulation-it will uphold the law and reject
the challenge.").
471. Not everyone is convinced by Justice Scalia's attempt to distinguish a ban on race or
sex-based expression creating a hostile work environment from a race or sex-based
expression amounting to a hate crime. See, e.g., Oring & Hampton, supra note 470, at 146;
Guy-Uriel E. Charles, ColoredSpeech: Cross Burning, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the
Crits?, 93 Geo. L.J. 575, 594 (2005). In his concurrence, Justice Byron White observed that
"there is a simple explanation for the Court's eagerness to craft an exception to its new First
Amendment rule . . . . Title VII hostile work environment claims would suddenly be
unconstitutional." R.A. V.,505 U.S. at 409 (White, J., concurring).
472. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment,39 UCLA L. Rev.
1791, 1845 (1992).
473. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
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viewpoint. 474 And as discussed in Part II, it is also at odds with the change
in the religion clause paradigm, where religious and secular organizations
are treated much more equally.
A full-fledged discussion of whether antidiscrimination laws trump
churches' free speech rights is the subject of another article. 4 75 It suffices
to say, however, that it is far from a foregone conclusion that religious
employers may discriminate with impunity under the auspices of freedom
of expressive association.
CONCLUSION
As applied by the lower courts, the ministerial exemption currently grants
religious organizations full immunity from Title VII claims brought by
This Article demonstrates, however, that the
ministerial employees.
constitutional justifications offered by courts and commentators alike do not
support this broad exemption.
There is no valid constitutional basis to apply the ministerial exemption
to religious organizations whose religious beliefs do not require race or sex
discrimination.
Title VII claims against organizations with no
discriminatory practices or messages do not implicate free exercise 4 76 or
freedom of expressive association. A small subset of Title VII claims may
raise establishment clause issues, but any unconstitutional entanglement
may be avoided by deferring to religious employers on matters of subjective
professional evaluations and by limiting remedies.
The ministerial exemption stands on firmer footing when invoked by
religious organizations with discriminatory tenets, but ironically not
because of the religion clauses. The free exercise clause is not violated by
Title VII claims against these employers, because Title VII is a neutral law
of general applicability that does not target religion. The establishment
clause is not violated because there are no doctrinal questions to settle.
After Dale, however, these employers may find refuge in the right of
expressive association, 4 77 although this is not a foregone conclusion.
474. Marshall, In Defense of Smith, supra note 208, at 320 ("[A] constitutional preference
for... [religion] cuts at the heart of the central principle of the Free Speech Clause-that
every idea is of equal dignity and status in the marketplace of ideas.").
475. Such a discussion would have to grapple with, for example, the fact that the state's
interests in Title VII are greater than they were compared to Dale, but at the same time, the
state's deference to associations is also greater following Dale.
476. In any event, Title VII is a neutral law of general applicability, so it is irrelevant if it
burdens religious practices.
477. Notably, any protection to religious organizations would also extend to their secular
counterparts with similar messages. Moreover, even if the Supreme Court concluded that
these organizations' expressive rights outweigh the state's interest in combating
discrimination, it would not follow that these organizations are entitled to government
contracts or grants. Indeed, the state has long refused to fund secular organizations that
engage in invidious sex and race discrimination, and the rules should be no different for
religious organizations. A uniform policy of not publicly funding organizations that
discriminate dovetails with the new emphasis on equal treatment between religious and
secular organizations.

